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CAVEATS FROM KARLSRUHE AND BERLIN:
WHITHER DEMOCRACY AFTER LISBON?
Davor Jan6i6 *
This Article analyzes the evolution of the reasoning about E. U.
democracy that the German Federal Constitutional Court
(BVerfG) has been shaping starting with the Solange I and II,
Maastricht, and European Arrest Warrant cases and culminating
with the Lisbon Treaty case. The BVerfG's reasoning has often
taken the form of caveats, whereby the BVerfG "warned" the
European Union of its assessments of the state of democracy in the
Union. This Article argues that the BVerfG's view of the primary
source of the Union's democratic legitimacy has gradually shifted
away from the European towards the German Parliament. Never
before has the BVerfG highlighted the role of national parliaments
in buttressing E. U. democracy with such clarity. In what can be
called "democracy solange, " the BVerfG ruled that as long as the
European Union is an association of sovereign states, two
consequences ensue: (a) the democratic legitimacy provided by
national parliaments and governments, and complemented by the
European Parliament, is sufficient; and (b) E. U. democracy
cannot and need not be shaped in analogy to that of a state. As a
corollary, the German system of parliamentary involvement in
E. U. affairs has significantly been overhauled to enhance the legal
position of the German Parliament vis-a-vis the Federal
Government. The initial academic reactions to the BVerfG's
Lisbon judgment have failed to credit the BVerfG's role in this
important development.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1
This Article analyzes the evolution of the reasoning of the German Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht or the BVerfG) regarding the
democratic legitimacy of European integration by juxtaposing the BVerfG's
previous case law on the European Union (E.U. or the Union),2 including the
Solange I and II, Maastricht, and European Arrest Warrant cases, with its judgment
on the Lisbon Treaty (Lissabon-Urteio. The BVerfG's reasoning has often taken the
shape of caveats, whereby the BVerfG has "warned" the European Union of its
assessments of the state of democracy in the Union. Each of the cases is examined as
' The English language versions of the case law used and the paragraphs cited in this Article are
taken from the sources referred to in the footnotes. This is important because the version, translation, and
paragraphing done by the German Federal Constitutional Court may differ from those published in the
Common Market Law Reports (C.M.L.R.). All the provisions cited in this Article refer to their new
numbering according to the Lisbon Treaty, unless otherwise specified.
2 The creation of the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty (signed on February 7, 1992, and
entered into force on November 1, 1993) added intergovernmental cooperation in Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) to the supranational cooperation of the
European Community (E.C.), which was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. These three policy
clusters-the E.C., CFSP, and JHA-each consisted of different policy fields and were commonly
referred to as "pillars" despite the fact that none of the founding treaties has ever used the term. The E.C.
was the First Pillar, CFSP was the Second Pillar, and JHA was the Third Pillar. The Amsterdam Treaty
(signed on October 2, 1997, and entered into force on May 1, 1999) transferred the JHA policies related to
visas, asylum, immigration, and other policies related to free movement of persons from the Third Pillar
to Title IV, Part III of the First Pillar. The remainder of the Third Pillar was then renamed Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM). Together with the Schengen acquis, the new Title IV
of the First Pillar and the PJCCM served to fulfill a new Union objective enshrined by the Amsterdam
Treaty: to establish an area of freedom, security, and justice. The Lisbon Treaty (signed on December 13,
2007, and entered into force on December 1, 2009) marred the contours of the pillars by merging the
policies falling under the E.C. and PJCCM into one treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union ("E.C. Treaty"), thereby subjecting these two pillars to the same rules. CFSP remains in a separate
treaty, the Treaty on European Union ("E.U. Treaty"), and continues to be subject to separate rules.
Therefore, there are now two pillars-the CFSP and the rest.
Since the rules governing the operation of the pillars have not changed profoundly, it is useful to
recall the key characteristics of the two pillars that remain after the Lisbon Treaty. In the post-Lisbon First
Pillar (E.C. & PJJCM), the legislative initiative rests solely with the Commission; the European
Parliament legislates together with the Council (as a rule following the "ordinary legislative procedure,"
formerly known as "codecision"); the regulations thus made are directly applicable and prevail over past
and future legislation of the Member States (not necessarily over their constitutional law); directives are,
as a rule, not directly applicable and need to be transposed into national law; and the European Court of
Justice (E.C.J.) has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation and validity of the law
made under this pillar. In the pre-Lisbon Third Pillar, the Commission was only associated with decision-
making; the European Parliament was consulted; and the jurisdiction of the E.C.J. was more reduced than
in the First Pillar and was subject to acceptance by the Member States by means of a declaration. In the
post-Lisbon Second Pillar (CFSP), the initiative to adopt legal acts is shared between the Member States,
the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
(although in practice it is the Member States that exercise this initiative in the vast majority of cases); then
the European Parliament is merely consulted; and finally the jurisdiction of the E.C.J. is excluded. For
further information, see recent analyses in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND LISBON (Jan
Wouters et al. eds., 2009); THE LISBON TREATY: EU CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL
TREATY (Stefan Griller & Jacques Ziller eds., 2008); STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW
(2006): EILEEN DENZA. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PILLARS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002).
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a step in which the BVerfG offers its caveats on democracy. The sequence of these
caveats through the decades exhibits a tendency towards intensification as the
integration deepens.
This Article argues that there has been a gradual shift in the emphasis that the
BVerfG has placed on European versus national parliamentary institutions as pillars
of E.U. democracy. The source of democratic legitimacy has moved away from the
European and towards the German and other national parliaments. As a corollary of
this trend, the German system of parliamentary involvement in E.U. affairs has
undergone a far-reaching overhaul that has considerably enhanced the legal position
of the German Parliament (Bundestag and Bundesrat) vis-a-vis the Federal
Government (Bundesregierung). New instruments of parliamentary scrutiny have
been established, existing ones broadened, and abeyant ones revived. From more
diversified information to approval requirements to the parliamentary reserve,
reforms abound. The initial academic reactions to the Lissabon-Urteil have failed to
credit the BVerfG's role in this important development.
Further, the relevance of the present analysis lies in the fact that, although the
principle of democracy has almost always been an explicit or implicit litmus test of
the BVerfG, the significance of this principle reached its apex with the Lissabon-
Urteil. Unlike in its previous case law, the BVerfG unambiguously and conclusively
refused to endorse the European Parliament as a primary institution of E.U.
democracy.
In this judgment, the BVerfG employed essentially the same reasoning as in its
Maastricht judgment (Maastricht-Urteio.3  Sovereignty is still the guiding
explanatory doctrine and national parliaments are now more than ever the central
institutions of the Union's democracy. Yet the BVerfG not only restated its old
reasoning but also refined it by formulating a "democracy solange." It thereby set the
legal boundaries for the European Union's development as a constitutional
construct.4 It did so by assuming that (parliamentary) democracy exists only in the
Member States. Since the Union is not a state but an association of states
(Staatenverbund), the European Union cannot and need not fulfill the national
democratic criteria. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz)5 does not even permit the
European Union to become a state. The relinquishment of German sovereignty to an
international or supranational organization beyond an association of sovereign states
3 See also Editorial, Karlsruhe Has Spoken, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1023, 1030 (2006).
4 See also Roland Bieber, Comments on the German Constitutional Court's Decision on the
Lisbon Treaty: "An Association of Sovereign States," 5 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 391, 393 (2009).
5 Although bearing the name "Basic Law" (Grundgesetz), this document is the Constitution of
Germany. At the time of the drafting of this document, the term "constitution" (Verfassung) was
deliberately avoided. The Herrenchiemsee Convention, which was set up in August 1948 at the Western
Allied Powers' request that a democratic constitution be adopted for the three Western occupation zones,
regarded Grundgesetz as provisional, so that, once reunified, Germany could adopt a Verfassung. In May
1949, the Parliamentary Council, presided over by Konrad Adenauer, adopted the final text of the Basic
Law. Following the approval of the occupying powers, the Basic Law was promulgated on May 23, 1949,
and came into effect the following day as the Constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of
Germany or Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Upon reunification with East Germany (German Democratic
Republic or Deutsche Demokratische Republik) in October 1990, the Basic Law became the constitution
of the reunified Germany. Marten Burkens, The Federal Republic of Germany, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF 15 EU MEMBER STATES 311, 312 (Lucas Prakke & Constantijn Kortmann eds., 2004).
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is prohibited. It would only be permitted if the German people, acting jointly as
pouvoir constituant, decided so by adopting a new constitution pursuant to Article
146 of the Basic Law.6 Therefore, as long as the current Basic Law is in force, the
national parliaments of the Member States will remain the primary source of the
Union's democratic legitimization and the European Parliament the secondary one.
To fortify this, the BVerfG ordered the enactment of a series of safeguards for the
German Parliament. In September 2009, three statutes were passed to that effect, the
most innovative provisions of which will be analyzed in greater detail.
II. THE SOLANGE I CASE: LET THERE BE A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT...
On May 29, 1974, in what has become widely known as the Solange I
judgment,7 the German Federal Constitutional Court clarified the relationship
between Community law and the Basic Law by deciding that it could and would
review their mutual compatibility regarding the protection of fundamental rights as
long as the Community failed to guarantee the same level of protection as that
guaranteed by the Basic Law. In doing so, the BVerfG made two important
appraisals of the state of democracy in the Community at that time:
As long as the integration process has not progressed so far that
Community law also receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided
on by a parliament and of settled validity, which is adequate in
comparison with the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the
Constitution, a reference by a court in the Federal Republic of Germany..
* is admissible .... 8
The Community still lacks a democratically legitimated parliament
directly elected by general suffrage which possesses legislative powers
and to which the Community organs empowered to legislate are fully
responsible on a political level .... 9
However, the BVerfG reached these findings two years before the Council
adopted the decision providing for the election of the European Parliament by direct
6 Article 146 of the Basic Law reads: "This Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity
and freedom of Germany applies to the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a
constitution freely adopted by the German people takes effect." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art.
146. This also reflects the "provisional" character of the Basic Law, as opposed to the "permanent"
character of an imaginary future Verfassung.
7 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974 (Solange 1),
2 C.M.L.R. 540 (F.R.G.). The plaintiff, a German export/import undertaking, requested that the BVerfG
review the decision of the Administrative Court in Frankfurt am Main (Verwaltungsgericht) whereby
some 17,000 Deutsche Marks paid by the plaintiff as a deposit for an intended business transaction were
forfeited pursuant to two contested regulations of the then-European Economic Community, which
required appropriate licenses to import and export certain products into and from the Community. These
licenses were issued by competent national administrative authorities upon the deposit of a certain amount
of money as a guarantee that importation or exportation would be performed. The plaintiff failed to
perform the required importation or exportation and therefore had its deposit forfeited. In other words, the
Community imposed conditions in the form of licenses and deposits that are directly applicable to the
legal persons established in the Member States that wish to engage in trade in goods with non-E.E.C.
Member States. The BVerfG found that the contested Community legislation did not infringe the freedom
of trade and occupation established by Article 12 of the Basic Law.
8 Id. 35 (emphasis added).
9 Id. 23 (emphasis added).
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universal suffrage (1976)10 and five years before the first members of the European
Parliament were actually elected (1979). Nowadays, the European Union has a
directly elected parliament, but whether it lives up to the national democratic
standards and whether any such comparison is valid at all is a point of contention
that the BVerfG tackled keenly in the Lissabon-Urteil.
The significance of these claims lies in the following. First, the BVerfG created
a link between the democratic quality of Community institutions and the validity of
Community law to the extent that the involvement of a parliamentary body directly
representing the citizens was deemed a prerequisite for satisfactory protection of
fundamental rights. Yet the decision was not unanimous on this point. The dissenting
judges Rupp, Hirsch, and Wand argued that:
[T]he protection of fundamental rights and the democratic principle are
not interchangeable inside a democratically constituted Community based
on the idea of freedom; they complement one another. While the
achievement of the democratic principle in the E.E.C. would cause the
legislator and the executive to be more deeply concerned with
fundamental rights, this would not make the judicial protection of
fundamental rights superfluous.11
Second, the BVerfG utilized national democratic criteria to assess the European
Parliament, which it would use consistently in all the subsequent case law under
review.
III. THE SOLANGE II CASE: ... UNLESS THERE IS ALREADY ONE ...
On October 22, 1986, in a follow-up judgment, dubbed Solange 1 12 the BVerfG
ceased the exercise of review of the constitutionality of Community law against the
catalogue of fundamental rights laid down in the Basic Law, because it concluded
that the conditions defined in Solange I had been met. It reached this conclusion by
applying the Solange I tests concerning the catalogue of fundamental rights and the
participation of a parliamentary body in the elaboration of such a catalogue. In
performing the latter test, the BVerfG found that the democracy principle was
respected principally due to three assessments. First, all Member States had acceded
to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(E.C.H.R.) which was duly approved by their national parliaments." Second, the
10 Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom: Decision of the Representatives of the
Member States Meeting in the Council Relating to the Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives
of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage, 1976 O.J. (L 278) 1. See infra text accompanying notes
103-14.
11 Solange 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 540, 62.
12 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986 (Solange I),
3 C.M.L.R. 225 (F.R.G.). The applicant's allegation of the unlawfulness of the refusal to be issued a
license to import preserved mushrooms from non-E.U. Member States into Germany, which competent
national authorities were permitted to do under several contested Community regulations if such
importation or exportation would lead to serious disturbances in the Community market, was left
unanswered. Instead, the BVerfG upheld the decision of the Federal Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of the Administrative
Court in Frankfurt, which in the applicant's view disregarded its procedural and substantial constitutional
rights.
13 Id. 45.
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European Parliament was one of the signatories of the joint declaration of April 5,
1977, which attached prime importance to the protection of fundamental rights as
flowing from the constitutions of the Member States and the E.C.H.R.14 The
declaration was accepted as "sufficient parliamentary recognition of a formulated
catalogue of effectively operating fundamental rights." Third, the European Council
adopted a declaration on democracy on April 7-8, 1978, solemnly affirming that the
"respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human rights in each
Member State are essential elements of membership of the European
Communities."15
The BVerfG nonetheless retained its jurisdiction to review secondary
Community law as regards fundamental rights, should the circumstances so
require. 16 The caveats by the dissenting judges in Solange I cannot have fallen on
deaf ears, because this time the BVerfG severed the causal link between the state of
democratic development of the European Union and its own right to decide on the
exercise of the power of review. The BVerfG addressed the basis for the Solange I
finding about the deficiencies of the European Parliament as follows:
[C]learly the consideration that protection of fundamental rights has to
begin as early as the stage of law-making and parliamentary responsibility
provides a suitable protective arrangement for that purpose. There was no
intention however of laying down a constitutional requirement that such a
position must have prevailed before there could be any possibility of the
withdrawal of the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisdiction over derived
Community law ....17
Though the BVerfG was not negative towards the European Parliament as a
provider of democratic legitimacy in the European Union, this was the first indicator
of the shifting balance that would only unravel later.
IV. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY CASE: ... WHICH MAY NOT SUPPLANT
THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT...
On October 12, 1993, in its landmark Maastricht-Urteil,18 the German Federal
Constitutional Court reaffirmed its subsidiary protection of fundamental rights and
14 Id. 42.
1 Id. 43.
16 This is implicit in two passages: (a) in the "solange" (the German word for "as long as")
formula itself, whereby the BVerfG claimed that it "will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on
the applicability of secondary Community legislation," and (b) in the BVerfG's emphasis that "[w]hat is
decisive.., is the attitude of principle which the BVerfG maintains at this stage," thus reserving for itself
the possibility potentially to exercise its jurisdiction again in the future. Id. 44, 48 (emphasis added).
17 Id. 45.
18 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993 (Maastricht-
Urteil), 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (F.R.G.). The judgment sparked a particularly animated debate both in Germany
and throughout the Union. See Steve Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Is
Germany the "Virginia of Europe"? (NYU Sch. of Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 5/95, 1995),
available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/95/9505ind.html; Julio Baquero Cruz, The
Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 EUR. L.J. 389 (2008); Ulrich Everling,
The Maastricht Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court and Its Significance for the
Development of the European Union, 14 Y.B. EUR. L. 1 (1994); Jochen Frowein, Das Maastricht-Urteil
und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, 54 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 1 (1994); Dieter Grimm, The
European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective After the
2010]
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thoroughly examined the role of the Bundestag in the process of far-reaching
European unification brought about by the Maastricht Treaty. The only admissible
constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) was the one that challenged the
German Act of Accession to the Treaty on European Union by alleging an
infringement of the rights guaranteed in Article 38 of the Basic Law, which provides
for mandatory direct election of the members of the Bundestag by Germans entitled
to vote. 19 The complaint was ruled unfounded.
At the outset, the BVerfG found that the fundamental democratic content of the
right to vote contained in Article 38 is an "individually assertable right to participate
in the election of the Bundestag and thereby to cooperate in the legitimation of state
,,20power by the people at federal level and to have an influence over its exercise.The BVerfG furthermore stressed that Article 38:
[E]xcludes the possibility, in matters to which Article 23 applies, 21 of
reducing the content of the legitimation of state power and the influence
on its exercise provided by the electoral process by transferring powers to
such an extent that there is a breach of the democratic principle in so far as
it is declared unassailable by Article 79(3) in conjunction with Article
20(1) and (2).22
Maastricht Decision, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 229 (1996); Matthias Herdegen, Maastricht and the German
Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an "Ever Closer Union," 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
235 (1994); Doris Kdnig, Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Vertrag von Maastricht-Ein
Stolperstein aufdem Weg in die europdische Integration?, 54 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 17 (1994); Kevin
D. Makowski, Solange III: The German Federal Constitutional Court's Decision on Accession to the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. 155 (1995); Karl M. Meessen, Hedging
European Integration: The Maastricht Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 511 (1994); Christian Tomuschat, Die Europdische Union unter der Aufsicht des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRiFT 489 (1993); DAs MAASTRICHT-
URTEIL DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS VOM 12 OKTOBER 1993 (Ingo Winkelmann ed., 1994);
Joachim Wieland, Germany in the European Union-The Maastricht Decision of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 259 (1994).
19 Article 38 of the Basic Law reads:
(1) Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct,
free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole
people, not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their
conscience. (2) Any person who has attained the age of eighteen shall be
entitled to vote; any person who has attained the age of majority may be
elected. (3) Details shall be regulated by a federal law.
20 Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 4.
21 Article 23 of the Basic Law regulates Germany's participation in the European Union.
Paragraph 1 thereof, to which the BVerfG referred in this passage, reads:
With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of
Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is
committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and
to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of
basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this
end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent
of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well as
changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or
supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements
possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.
22 Maastricht-UrteiL. 1 C.M.L.R. 57. 5.
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The BVerfG thus affirmed as central the constitutional principle that all state
authority is derived from the people and is exercised by them through the legislative,
executive, and judicial bodies.23
Most significantly, the BVerfG's reasoning about the function of the German
Parliament within the European constitutional order stems from its ultimate stance
24that Germany is one of the Masters of the Treaties (Herren der Vertrdge), which it
previously heralded in the Kloppenburg case. The European Union is a
Staatenverbund,26 a federation of states and not a federal state. 7 The implications of
21this can be divided into three groups.
In the first place, the BVerfG highlighted that democratic legitimation within the
Union cannot be produced in the same way as within a national order, 29 because the
exercise of sovereign power in the European Union is primarily determined
governmentally, i.e., it is based on authorizations from the Member States.30 The
immediate corollary thereof is that the Bundestag, and thus also the citizens entitled
to vote, "necessarily lose some influence on the processes of political will-formation
and decision-making. ' 31 Majority voting in the Council of Ministers aggravates this,
because a Member State's representative in the Council32 does not have the right of
veto and might thus be outvoted. Whenever the representative does indeed defend
the parliament's position in the Council but is outvoted, the national mechanism of
political responsibility of the Government to the Parliament, which remains
23 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 20(2).
24 Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 55. See also Karen Alter, Who Are the "Masters of the
Treaty"?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121 (1998).
25 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 8, 1987
(Kloppenburg), 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (F.R.G.). The constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) brought
before the BVerfG sought the annulment of the decision of the German Federal Supreme Finance Court
(Bundesfinanzho') that held that the applicant could not rely on the Sixth VAT Directive-which
Germany had not duly implemented within the specified time limit-to secure an exemption from VAT
for her credit and mortgage agency. The BVerfG allowed the complaint and set aside the decision of the
Bundesfinanzhof arguing that the European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) did not claim for the Community a
new legislative power but that it only defined in detail the legal effects of an existing power. Id. 17. In
effect, the E.C.J. created a new category of sanction against the Member States for the non-
implementation of directives by enabling private individuals to invoke such unimplemented Community
directives before the courts. Id. 18. Having conceded that, the BVerfG asserted that "[t]he Community
has not been given adjudicative power by the E.E.C. Treaty to extend its jurisdiction limitlessly. The
Community is not a sovereign state within the meaning of international law,... [and] the Member States
are now, and always have been, the masters of the Community treaties ..." Id. 19.
26 This term was coined by Paul Kirchhof, the reporting judge in the Maastricht-Urteil, in an
article published in 1992. See DER STAATENVERBUND DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION (Peter Hommelhoff &
Paul Kirschof eds., 1994).
27 The BVerfG used this concept thriftlessly. See Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 33, 38,
43, 46, 51, 55, 94, 104. However, describing the European Union as a "federation" of states is misleading
because a federation is a type of state.
2' For a more theoretical account, see Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty
Now, 1 EUR. L.J. 259 (1995).
29 Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 36.
" Id. 46.
31 id.
32 A Member State's representative in the Council will typically be the competent government
minister. In Germany, in a vast majority of the cases this will be the competent minister of the Federal
Government. Only in certain, precisely defined cases will it be possible for Germany to be represented in
the Council by a representative of the Lander designated by the Bundesrat. See infra Part VII.A.3.
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otherwise applicable, is eviscerated because the representative fulfilled what the
Parliament demanded. Yet the BVerfG ruled that majority voting is not only
acceptable but also necessary because of the principle of openness, i.e., friendliness,
towards European law, which is expressly stated in the Basic Law.33
A second implication of the BVerfG's reliance on sovereignty as a sole
theoretical explanation of the Union is "it is first and foremost the national peoples
of the Member States who, through their national parliaments, have to provide the
democratic legitimation. 34 Crucially, the BVerfG ruled that "a legitimation and an
influence proceeding from the people" is a precondition for membership. 35 Because
such legitimation:
[N]ecessarily comes about through the feedback of the actions of the
European institutions into the parliaments of the Member States .... it is
decisive that the democratic bases of the European Union are built up in
step with integration, and that as integration proceeds a thriving
democracy is also maintained in the Member States.
36
In other words, "sufficient functions and powers of substantial importance must
remain for the German Bundestag, 37 which the BVerfG found was fulfilled through
elections to the Bundestag, which-jointly with the Bundesrat-may, but need not,
adopt a statute approving the accession to a community of states such as the
European Union, and thus open the German constitutional order to the application of
European law. By means of such a statute, both the existence of the European Union
itself and its power to take majority decisions are democratically legitimized.38
Hence, any competence claimed by the Union that is not covered by an approving
statute renders the acts based on such a competence inapplicable (but not invalid)39
in Germany, because they exceed the express authorization of the Bundestag.
It is paramount for a proper assessment by the German Parliament of whether it
should adopt such a statute that the rights and duties resulting from Germany's
membership in the European Union be defined in the founding treaties with
sufficient certainty and in a predictable manner. 40 These are achieved by the Union's
" See infra Part VI.G.
14 Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 39.
15 Id. 38.
36 Id. 43.
17 Id. 45.
" Id. 37.
'9 The difference between the validity and applicability of E.U. law stems from the German legal
doctrine that the legal orders of the European Union and of Germany are separate. Due to this
separateness, the E.C.J. is competent to decide on the validity of Community law, and the BVerfG is
competent to decide on the validity of German law. These two courts decide on the validity of the legal
acts made within their own legal order. For that reason, the BVerfG found that it could not invalidate an
act that had been made outside its legal order and thus outside of the purview of its constitutional
jurisdiction. What it could nonetheless do is render an E.U. legal act inapplicable in Germany, if it falls
outside the ambit of the statute approving Germany's accession to the Union. The inapplicability therefore
derives from the doctrine that E.U. law is applicable in Germany exclusively by means of such an
approving statute, or what is known as Rechtsanwendungsbefehl, i.e., Germany's order to apply E.U. law
domestically. See also Dieter Grimm, Comments on the German Constitutional Court's Decision on the
Lisbon Treaty: Defending Sovereign Statehood Against Transforming the European Union into a State, 5
EUR. CONST. L. REv. 353,354 (2009).
41 Maastricht-UrteiL. 1 C.M.L.R. 57. 49.
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adherence to what the BVerfG refers to as the principle of "limited individual
empowerment, 41 which is more commonly known as the principle of conferral,42 as
well as by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.43
41 Id. 33, 52, 59, 61, 77, 98, 100.
42 The principle of conferral governs the existence and limits of E.U. competence. Its meaning is
threefold: (a) the European Union may only act in the areas conferred upon it by the Member States; (b) it
may only do so to attain the objectives set out in the founding treaties; and (c) the competences not
conferred remain with the Member States. Treaty on European Union, arts. 4(1), 5(2), May 9, 2008, 2008
O.J. (C 115) 13 [hereinafter E.U. Treaty].
There are three main categories of E.U. competence. First, in the fields of exclusive E. U.
competence only the European Union may act freely, and the Member States may act only if empowered
by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 2(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereainafter E.C. Treaty]. Within the exclusive E.U.
competence, the Union may act in two ways. On the one hand, it may legislate in the following five fields:
customs union; competition; monetary policy for the Eurozone; conservation of marine biological
resources under the common fisheries policy; and common commercial policy. On the other hand, it may
conclude international agreements where that is provided for in a Union legislative act or is necessary to
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence. E.C. Treaty art. 3.
Second, in the fields of shared competence, both the European Union and the Member States
may act. Yet while the Union may act freely, the Member States may only act to the extent that the Union
has not exercised its competence or has decided to cease exercising it. E.C. Treaty art. 2(2). Furthermore,
if the Union decides to act in a certain field of shared competence, such E.U. action refers only to the
specific element of the field in which it acted and not to the entire field. Protocol No. 25 on the Exercise
of Shared Competence annexed to the founding treaties. In the remaining elements of the fields where the
Union acted, and in the fields where it did not act at all, the Member States may act freely. There are three
groups of shared competence. The first group is listed exempli causa: internal market; certain aspects of
social policy; economic, social and territorial cohesion; agriculture and fisheries; environment; consumer
protection; transport; trans-European networks; energy; area of freedom, security and justice; and certain
aspects of common safety concerns in public health matters. E.C. Treaty art. 4(2). The second group of
shared competence is residual and encompasses any area that does not fall either under exclusive or under
supporting, coordinating, or supplementing competence. E.C. Treaty art. 4(1). The third group of shared
competence empowers the Union to carry out certain activities which do not prevent the Member States
from exercising their own competence: (a) in the fields of research, technological development, and space,
in order to define and implement programs; and (b) in the fields of development cooperation and
humanitarian aid, in order to conduct a common policy. E.C. Treaty arts. 4(3)-(4).
Third, the European Union has the competence to support, coordinate, or supplement the
Member States' action, without thereby superseding their competence or harmonizing their laws or
regulations, in the following fields: protection and improvement of human health; industry; culture;
tourism; education, vocational training, youth, and sport; civil protection; and administrative cooperation.
E.C. Treaty arts. 2(5)-(6).
Two categories of E.U. competence have, for political reasons, been placed outside this
threefold classification. The first is the E.U. competence to adopt certain measures with respect to
Member States' policies in the fields of economy, employment, and social policy. E.C. Treaty arts. 2(3)-
(5). The second is the E.U. competence to define and implement a common foreign and security policy,
including the progressive framing of a common defense policy. E.C. Treaty art. 2(4). See also Paul Craig,
The Treaty ofLisbon, Process, Architecture and Substance, 33 EUR. L. REV. 137 (2008); Paul Craig,
Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment, and Consideration, 29 EUR. L. REV. 323 (2004); Stephen
Weatherill, Competence Creep and Competence Control, 23 Y.B. EUR. L. 1 (2004); Stephen Weatherill,
Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the Distribution of Competence to Regulate the Internal Market, in THE
LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES 41 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne
Scott eds., 2002).
4' The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality govern the use of E.U. competence.
Subsidiarity requires that:
[I]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall
act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at
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However, since the adoption of a statute on accession to the European Union is
a sovereign decision of Germany, placed in the hands of the democratically elected
Bundestag, it may also be revoked. There is nothing that the Union could do to
prevent Germany from revoking its adherence to the founding treaties, because
"common authority . .. is derived from the Member States and can only have
binding effects within the German sovereign sphere by virtue of the German
instruction that its law be applied., 44 The instruction to apply E.U. law in Germany
(Rechtsanwendungsbefehl) is the mentioned statute approving Germany's accession
to the Union. Any E.U. act that falls outside the ambit of this statute is ultra vires; it
"breaks out" from this statute and from the instruction contained therein
(ausbrechender Rechtsakt), and may therefore not be applied in Germany.45 The
BVerfG thereby laid claim to the constitutional Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e., to the
ultimate authority to decide about the distribution of competences between the Union
and Germany. The BVerfG recognized the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the
European Court of Justice (E.C.J.), i.e., its ultimate authority to decide about the
extent of the competences conferred on the Union, only insofar as the E.C.J. did not
interpret the conferred competences in a way that would drastically exceed the limits
contained in the German approving statute and that would thus in effect create a new
power of the Union. 46 It is this shift away from the fundamental rights paradigm
towards the scrutiny of the question of whether the E.U. law at hand is covered by
the German approving statute that brought the German Federal Constitutional Court
into conflict with the E.C.J.
47
Nevertheless, the BVerfG decided that the casting of a ballot during elections to
the Bundestag does not suffice if democracy is not to remain a merely formal
principle of accountability. Democracy also involves the presence of certain factual,
pre-legal conditions, which include: (a) a continuous free debate between opposing
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.
E.U. Treaty art. 5(3). Proportionality requires that "the content and form of Union action shall
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties." E.U. Treaty art. 5(4). These two
principles are further elaborated upon in Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Principles of
Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the founding treaties. See Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of
the Proportionality Principle in EULaw, 16 EUR. L.J. 158 (2010); N.W. Barber, Subsidiarity in the Draft
Constitution, 11 FUR. PUB. L. 197 (2005); George Bermann, Proportionality and Subsidiarity, in THE
LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES 75 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne
Scott eds., 2002); Christoph Henkel, Allocation of Powers in the European Union: A Closer Look at the
Principle of Subsidiarity, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 359 (2002); Gr~inne de Barca, Reappraising
Subsidiarity's Significance After Amsterdam (Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 7/99, 1999),
available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/99/990701.html; George Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
331 (1994).
44 Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 55.
41 Mattias Kumm, Who Is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions
of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice,
36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 351, 364 (1999).
46 For the distinction between constitutional and judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, see MONICA
CLAES, THE NATIONAL COURTS' MANDATE IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 606-10 (2006); Juliane
Kokott, Report on Germany, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS-DOCTRINE AND
JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT 77, 92-107 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds.,
1997).
41 Kokott, supra note 46, at 82.
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social forces, interests, and ideas, in which political goals are clarified and changed;
(b) the creation of a public opinion, which shapes political intentions; and (c) the
possibility for the citizens to communicate with organs exercising sovereign powers
in their own language. 48 Although these were held not to be in existence within the
institutional framework of the Union yet, they can develop over the course of time.49
A third implication of the BVerfG's sovereignty thesis is that the European
Parliament is merely an additional, supplementary source of democratic support for
the policies of the Union, yet a necessary one because of the broadening of
Community powers. Similarly, Union citizenship was also found to be of
supplementary nature. It is "a legally binding expression of the degree of de facto
community already in existence," which at that moment did not meet the conditions
necessary for it to become a subject of democratic legitimation of the Union, but the
BVerfG did not exclude the possibility of that occurring in the future.50 According to
Ress, this possibility could also be inferred from the BVerfG's starting point that the
complainant's right under Article 38 of the Basic Law can be deemed violated "if the
exercise of the powers of the Bundestag is transferred to an organ of the European
Union or the European Communities formed by the governments," which might
mean that such a transfer to an organ formed by the citizens-the European
Parliament-would not lead to the said violation.51 Moreover, the European
Parliament "could become stronger if it were to be elected by equivalent electoral
rules in all the Member States" and "if its influence on the policies and legislation of
the European Community were to increase. 52
A fourth implication lies in the BVerfG finding that the conditions attached to
the role of the German Parliament were fulfilled, because "the means of formation of
political intentions laid down by the Treaty do not at present have the effect of
reducing the content of the decision-making and supervisory powers of the
Bundestag to an extent which infringes the democratic principle. 53 This was so
chiefly for three reasons: (a) the requirement of a statute guarantees sufficient
involvement of the Bundestag and thus also of the German citizens in the processes
of concluding a new Treaty or amending the existing ones; 54 (b) the rights of
participation allow the Bundestag to be involved in the exercise of German
membership rights within the European institutions; 55 and (c) the Bundestag
influences the European policy of the Government through the latter's political
responsibility to the Bundestag.56
48 Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 41.
41 Id. 42.
51 Id. 40.
51 Georg Ress, Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty of October 12, 1993, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 539, 548 (1994) (emphasis in original).
52 Maastricht-Urteil, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 43.
51 Id. 33 (emphasis added).
54 Id. 56.
55 id.
56 Id. 57. The BVerfG refers to Articles 63 (appointment of the Federal Chancellor) and 67
(vote of no confidence) of the Basic Law. Article 68 (vote of confidence) establishes another means for
the Bundestag to oust the Federal Chancellor by rejecting his or her motion of confidence. Both the vote
of no confidence and the vote of confidence must be "constructive," which means that the Bundestag must
at the same time appoint a new Chancellor. This is meant to avoid a vacuum in the work of the executive.
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Finally, the BVerfG espoused the dualist approach to the German Parliament's
role in E.U. decision-making. By placing the Bundestag and the Bundesrat at the
legal frontier between Germany and the European Union, it assigned them the role of
gatekeeping, epitomized in the approval of Germany's accession to the Union. This
has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, the German Parliament's central function is
to decide on Germany's accession to the Union and to legitimize the transfer of
powers. On the other hand, once Germany becomes an E.U. Member State, the
national parliamentary rights of participation are limited to the German legal order
and directed at the control of the Government. The BVerfG did not foresee the
Bundestag's independent role in the process of elaboration of the Union's secondary
law once the transfer has taken place. Hence, the BVerfG fell short of piercing the
veil of the European constitutional order.
V. THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT CASE: ... AND MAY NOT AFFECT
ITS DUTY OF TRANSPOSITION...
On July 18, 2005, the BVerfG annulled in its entirety the German law
transposing the Framework Directive on the European Arrest Warrant (the EAW
Act).57 The constitutional complaint was filed by Mamoun Darkazanli, a citizen of
Germany and Syria, in order to obtain the annulment of his extradition to Spain
pursuant to the European arrest warrant issued by competent Spanish authorities
because of his alleged involvement in the terrorist activities of Al-Qaida.
The BVerfG ruled that the EAW Act infringed the complainant's fundamental
right not to be extradited to a foreign country. 58 Although the Basic Law-after the
constitutional amendment of November 29, 2000-permits extraditions of German
nationals to E.U. Member States,9 the BVerfG found that the proviso requiring such
extraditions to observe the rule of law was not satisfied, because the German
Parliament was under a duty to exhaust the margin of appreciation given to it by
See also Veith Mehde, Political Accountability in Germany, in POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN EUROPE:
WHICH WAY FORWARD? A TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN AN EU
CONTEXT 101 (Luc Verhey et al. eds., 2008).
" Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 18, 2005 (Darkazanli),
1 C.M.L.R. 16 (F.R.G.). See Simone Molders, European Arrest Warrant Act is Void-The Decision of the
German Federal Constitutional Court of18 July 2005, 7 GERMAN L.J. 45 (2005); Alicia Hinarejos Parga,
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court), Decision of 18 July 2005 (2 BvR 2236104) on
the German European Arrest Warrant Law, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 583 (2006); Nicolas Nohlen,
Germany: The European Arrest Warrant Case, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 153 (2008); Sebastian Wolf,
Demokratische Legitimation in der EUaus Sicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts nach dem Urteil zum
Europdischen Hafbefehlsgesetz, 38 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 350 (2005); Florian Geyer, The European Arrest
Warrant in Germany-Constitutional Mistrust Towards the Concept of Mutual Trust, in CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 101-24 (Elspeth Guild ed., 2006); Jan Kom~rek,
European Constitutional Pluralism and the European Arrest Warrant: In Search of the Limits of
"Contrapunctual Principles," 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 9 (2007); Joachim Vogel, Europdischer
Haftbefehl und deutsches Verfassungsrecht, 60 JURISTENZEITUNG 801 (2005).
8 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 16(2) (first sentence).
5 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 16(2) (second sentence).
60 The challenged E.U. legal act was a framework decision. Under the former Article 34(2)(b)
E.U., framework decisions did not have direct effect and had to be transposed, i.e., implemented, into
national law. They were binding upon the Member States as to the result to be achieved but left choice of
form and method to the national authorities. This choice thus left the implementing organ a certain degree
of discretion. In this judgment, the duty to exhaust the margin of appreciation meant, above all, that the
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the Framework Decision. 61 The duty of the German Parliament to give due
consideration to the encroachment of fundamental rights was corroborated by the
BVerfG's perception of Third Pillar62 law: it is "still an incomplete legal system...
intentionally characterized as a part of international law' 63 and "a way to preserve
national identity and statehood in a single European judicial area., 64
Significantly, the German Parliament bears a "particular responsibility" for
correct transposition because the measure at hand falls under the Third Pillar,
whereas such an elevated degree of parliamentary responsibility for transposition
does not arise in the case of Community directives. 6' Due to the nature of this
responsibility, the legitimation of Third Pillar law is incumbent primarily on national
parliaments and not on the European Parliament:
The European Parliament, sole source of legitimacy of European Law, is
merely "heard" in the legislative process .... which complies with the
requirements of the principle of democracy in the context of the "Third
Pillar," because the legislative bodies of the Member States retain their
political power to shape legislation when it comes to transposition of the
instrument, or if necessary through a refusal of transposition.6
The wide room for maneuvering reserved for the German Parliament in
transposing Third Pillar measures is thus consonant with the BVerfG's Maastricht
reasoning. The role of the German Parliament in Third Pillar law is envisaged only
ex post-that is, in transposing and not in creating it-even though involvement ex
ante could provide greater opportunity to shape legislation. In reaching the same
conclusion, Christian Tomuschat, who was an authorized representative of the
German Federal Government in the Lissabon proceedings, rightly claimed that as
long as the defining act of democratic legitimization is viewed in the approval of the
treaties by national parliaments, it does not matter whether the transfer of powers
leaves no room whatsoever for national parliaments or whether they can still
discharge modest functions of transposition. However, he argued somewhat too
readily that through the channels of information instituted by the German laws, "the
parliamentarian bodies can exert influence, regardless of whether the draft measures
are located in the field of Community law or in the 'third pillar."' 67 Parliamentary
German Parliament was obliged to achieve the result laid down in the Framework Decision in such a way
that any unavoidable limitation of the fundamental right of German citizens not to be extradited was
proportionate. See Darkazanli, 1 C.M.L.R. 16, 80, 96, 112, 113, 176.
61 Member States are allowed to refuse extradition to another Member State in seven cases.
Council Decision 2002/584/JHA, On the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between
Member States, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1. One of them is when the European arrest warrant relates to
offenses committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member State or in a place treated
as such, or where the offenses have been committed outside the territory of the issuing Member State and
the law of the executing Member State does not allow prosecution for the same offenses when committed
outside its territory. The contested provision of the EAW Act was the one transposing this ground for
refusal.
62 See supra note 2.
63 Darkazanli, 1 C.M.L.R. 16, 81.
64 Id. 75.
65 Id. 80.
66 Id. 81 (emphasis added).
67 Christian Tomuschat, Inconsistencies-The German Federal Constitutional Court on the
European Arrest Warrant, 2 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 216, 216-17 (2006) (emphasis added).
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influence is not only determined by the mere possession of information but also by a
vast multitude of other internal and external, as well as legal and political, factors.
The dissenting judges seem to have shared the same concern. Judge Lilbbe-
Wolff urged that "there are good grounds to resist drawing the conclusion from the
limited role of the Parliaments in the multilevel legislative process at issue that the
European Arrest Warrant Law . . . is unconstitutional because it infringes the
principle of democracy, 6 8 and that:
Deficits ... should not necessarily be attributed to the Union level and
resolved at that level. In particular, where legislation at the European level
requires unanimity in the Council ...as in the case of Framework
Decisions .... the development that remains to take place before we
achieve a better democratic foundation can and must also result from
strengthening the law and practice at the national level concerning
parliamentary influence on the voting behavior of the government
representatives in the Council.69
Judge Lilbbe-Wolff further reproved the majority opinion on the German
Parliament's right to refuse transposition: "[i]f democratic legitimation must be
sought in the freedom of Parliament to infringe Union Law, something is seriously
wrong. 70 In addition, in his dissenting opinion Judge BroB argued that the principle
of subsidiarity obliges the German Parliament "to give comprehensible reasons for
the 'integrational added value' of a legislative proposal in the context of the Third
Pillar,, 71 thereby ascribing considerable responsibility to the German Parliament for
enactments in this field.
At any rate, the BVerfG clarified that with regard to Third Pillar law, the
German Parliament prevails over the European Parliament. Given that the Lisbon
Treaty subjects the whole of the former Third Pillar to the ordinary legislative
procedure, formerly known as co-decision, it is interesting to see whether the
BVerfG will accordingly change its view in the future.
VI. THE LISBON TREATY CASE: ... AND IS NOT AND NEED NOT BE LIKE
THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENT
In the Lissabon-Urtei12 of June 30, 2009, the BVerfG examined the
constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty and the three related statutes: (a) the Act
Approving the Lisbon Treaty (the Approving Act), (b) the Act Amending the Basic
68 Darkazanli, 1 C.M.L.R. 16, 178.
69 Id. 180.
71 Id. 177.
71 Id. 149.
72 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 30, 2009 (Lissabon-
Urteil), 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 267 (F.R.G.). Six applications
were consolidated for joint adjudication: 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR
1259/08, and 2 BvR 182/09. The version used is the one available at the BVerfG's website in the English
language at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ es200906302bveOO0208en.html.
See Christian Wohlfahrt, The Lisbon Case: A Critical Summary, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1277 (2009).
71 Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon [Law Approving the Lisbon Treaty], Oct. 8,
2008. BGB1. II at 1038 (F.R.G.).
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Law (the Amending Act),74 and (c) the Draft Act Extending and Strengthening the
Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters (the "Draft
Extending Act"). 5 In this case, the BVerfG made three key decisions.
First, the BVerfG confirmed the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty itself.
Second, it declared the Draft Extending Act unconstitutional due to the insufficiently
elaborated rights of participation of the German Parliament in the process of
European unification. Third, the BVerfG withheld Germany's ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty by prohibiting the Federal President from depositing the ratification
instrument until new legislation was enacted to give sufficient rights to the German
Parliament to participate in E.U. affairs.
The salience of the principle of democracy in the Lissabon-Urteil lies inter alia
in the fact that the only two admissible claims were those invoking: 76 (a) a violation
of the right to participate in the election of members of the Bundestag guaranteed by
Article 38(1) of the Basic Law, and (b) a violation of the Bundestag's competence to
decide on the deployment of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), developed by
the BVerfG as a constitutional principle.77 The BVerfG reiterated that the right to
participate in national parliamentary elections is an individually assertable right
equivalent to a fundamental right: it guarantees not only the right to cast a ballot but
also the fundamental democratic content of that right.78
A. The Reassertion of Sovereignty: The Maastricht Legacy Endorsed
The cornerstones of the Lissabon-Urteil are the BVerfG's well-known concepts
of sovereignty, Staatenverbund, Member States as Herren der Vertrdge, and citizens
as subjects of democratic legitimization. From these concepts, the BVerfG inferred
that the following conditions were necessary for a far-reaching transfer of German
sovereign powers to the European Union: (1) sovereign statehood must be
maintained on the basis of the integration program; (2) the principle of conferral
must be respected; (3) the Member States' constitutional identity must be respected;
and (4) the Member States must not lose their ability to politically and socially shape
living conditions, which are their own responsibility.
79
74 Gesetz zur Anderung des Grundgesetzes [Law Amending the Basic Law], Oct. 8, 2008, BGBl.
I at 1926, arts. 23, 45, 93 (F.R.G.).
75 Entwurf eines Gesetzes ber die Ausweitung und Starkung der Rechte des Bundestages und
des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europflischen Union [Draft Act on the Extending and
Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in Matters Concerning the European Union],
Bundestags-Drucksache 16/8489 [hereinafter Draft Extending Act] (Mar. 11, 2008).
76 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 167.
77 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jul. 12, 1994
(Bundeswehreinsatz), 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 4 (F.R.G.). The
BVerfG ruled that the Basic Law obliges the Federal Government to obtain prior affirmative consent of
the Bundestag for a deployment of the German Armed Forces. In March 2005, the Parliamentary
Participation Act (Gesetz fiber die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung fiber den Einsatz
bewaffheter Streitkrlfte im Ausland, short name: Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) was passed requiring the
agreement of the Bundestag for the deployment of the German Armed Forces outside the scope of
application of the Basic Law.
78 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 172, 173, 174.
79 Id. 226 (emphasis added).
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The Member States constitute the primary political area of their polities,
whereas the European Union is the secondary one, derived from those of its Member
States and performing only those tasks that are expressly conferred on it by the
Member States.80 Therefore, "there can be no independent subject of legitimization
for the authority of the European Union which constitutes itself . . . on a higher
level., 81 The BVerfG explained this in the following terms:
[T]he source of Community authority, and of the European constitution
that constitutes it, are the peoples of Europe with their democratic
constitutions in their states. The "Constitution of Europe," the law of
international agreements or primary law, remains a derived fundamental
order. It establishes a supranational autonomy which is quite far-reaching
in political everyday life but is always limited factually.
82
Furthermore, the BVerfG peculiarly approached sovereignty as a divisible and
quantifiable concept whose elements can be enumerated. First, Germany must retain
sufficient space for the political formation of the economic, cultural, and social
circumstances of life. This applies particularly to political decisions that depend on
"previous understanding as regards culture, history and language and which unfold
in discourses in the space of a political public that is organized by party politics and
Parliament. 83 Second, the following fields were singled out as "especially
sensitive": criminal law, use of force, fiscal decisions, social policy, decisions on
family law, education systems, and religion.84 Such an approach was criticized by
Schdnberger as a "strange patchwork concept of statehood that owes nothing to state
theory and everything to political contingency," which he substantiated with the
argument that the right to coin money was not included in this "sovereignty list.
85
Halberstam and M61lers agreed and considered the BVerfG's enterprise "an
unnecessary theory of necessary state functions" that "makes no sense. 86
The BVerfG underscored that European integration is a process of "reversible
self-commitment," and that the German Parliament may decide to revoke its act of
transfer of powers and thus bring an end to Germany's membership in the Union:
According to the constitution, such steps of integration must be factually
limited by the act of transfer and must, in principle, be revocable. For this
reason, withdrawal from the European union of integration
(Integrationsverband) may, regardless of a commitment for an unlimited
period under an agreement, not be prevented by other Member States or
the autonomous authority of the Union. This is not a secession from a
state union (Staatsverband), which is problematical under international
go Id. 301. Elsewhere, the BVerfG describes the nature of the Union's powers as "an autonomy
to rule which is independent but derived," which is unfortunate because autonomy is always of narrower
scope than independence. Therefore, while independence always includes autonomy, autonomy never
includes independence.
" Id. 232.
12 Id. 231.
8 Id. 249.
8 Id. 252.
85 Christoph Schonberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht's Epigones at Sea, 10 GERMAN L.J.
1201, 1209 (2009).
86 Daniel Halberstam & Christoph Mo1lers, The German Constitutional Court Says "Ja zu
Deutschland!." 10 GERMAN L.J. 1241. 1249 (2009).
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law ... , but merely the withdrawal from a Staatenverbund which is
founded on the principle of the reversible self-commitment.
87
Since Article 50 E.U. envisages the right of the Member States to withdraw
from the Union, this finding by the BVerfG might mean that the German Parliament
would not even be obliged to follow the withdrawal procedure, which includes the
notification of the intention to withdraw to the European Council and the conclusion
of a withdrawal agreement.
Finally, the BVerfG emphasized that only the constituent power, that is, German
citizens entitled to vote, may decide the "ultimate limit of the participation of the
Federal Republic of Germany in European integration ... and not the state authority
founded on the constitution. 88 Hence, no state institution founded on the basis of the
Basic Law may of its own motion abandon the sovereign rights of the German
people. The BVerfG therefore reiterated its Maastricht finding that the transfer of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz by German state institutions is prohibited. 89 This means that
the German Parliament may not relinquish the right of "democratic self-
determination" pertaining to the German citizens by virtue of the constitutionally
guaranteed, inviolable, and unamendable principle of democracy. In this sense, the
BVerfG solemnly declares: "The Basic Law thus not only assumes sovereign
statehood but guarantees it."90
B. The "Democracy Solange ": The European Parliament's Supplementary
Status Anchored'
The BVerfG formulated two critical new caveats regarding the principle of
democracy and the participation of the people in the exercise of public power:
As long as, and to the extent to which, the principle of conferral is adhered
to in an association of sovereign states with marked traits of executive and
governmental cooperation, the legitimization provided by national
parliaments and governments, which is complemented and carried by the
directly elected European Parliament is, in principle, sufficient.92
As long as the European order of competences according to the principle
of conferral in cooperatively shaped decision-making procedures exists
taking into account the states' responsibility for integration, and as long as
a well-balanced equilibrium of the competences of the Union and the
competences of the states is retained, the democracy of the European
Union cannot, and need not, be shaped in analogy to that of a state.9
Put simply, as long as the Member States are the Masters of the Treaties, E.U.
democracy cannot and need not resemble national democratic patterns. The BVerfG
87 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 233 (emphasis added).
" Id. 179.
89 See also id 77 218, 228, 233, 236.
9' Id. 216.
91 have previously discussed this in Davor Jan~it, The German Lisbon Treaty Judgment:
Towards "Democracy Solange," 58 PRAvNi Z1VOT 71 (2009). See also Daniel Thym, In the Name of
Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,
46 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1795, 1813 (2009).
92 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 262 (emphasis added).
9' Id. 272 (emphasis added).
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explicitly claimed that the Basic Law permits "a different shaping of political
opinion-forming" at the E.U. level. 94 This could result in "derogations from the
organizational principles of democracy applying on the national level," which means
that "structural congruence" regarding the composition and representation of the
European Parliament need not be achieved. 95 However, if legislative powers were
exercised mainly at the E.U. level, and if an imbalance arose between the Union's
exercise of the transferred powers and their democratic legitimation, Germany could
withdraw from the Union.96
As in Maastricht, the European Parliament is understood as an institutional
supplement. The crucial novelty is that this supplementarity is now part of the
solange "lock," which means that the BVerfG is not likely to change its attitude
towards the European Parliament unless the European Union becomes a state. The
German Federal Constitutional Court seems to have adopted the stance that the
Union has reached its finalitY,97 which, in this author's view, goes beyond what the
editorial comment of the Common Market Law Review referred to as merely a
temporary unreadiness of the BVerfG to accept the European Parliament as a truly
democratically legitimized institution, which it otherwise rightly criticized as
"unnecessarily inflexible., 98 It is even more surprising that the BVerfG formulates a
"democracy solange" in a time when the European Parliament is gaining
unprecedented powers of codecision pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty. This could be
explained by the BVerfG's zero-sum approach to European democracy, according to
which the European and national parliaments cannot contemporaneously perform the
same function with the same degree of legitimacy. In the BVerfG's opinion, the
legitimacy furnished by national parliaments is primary, and that furnished by the
European Parliament secondary. The only way to change this equation is to do away
with the principle of conferral, which would mean that the European Union could
exercise not only the powers conferred on it by the Member States but also those
created by the Union itself. In other words, the European Parliament's claim to
primary provision of legitimacy in the Union could only materialize in a Union that
could decide its own powers (Kompetenz-Kompetenz), and which would therefore
exhibit the characteristics of a state. Yet such a shift of the Grundnorm99 from the
Member States to the Union has thus far not happened. Trevor Hartley describes this
aptly:
Community legislation and the judgments of the European Court owe
their validity to the Treaties, and the Treaties owe their validity to
Id. T 219.
9 Id. 227,266.
96 Id. 264.
17 See Editorial, On the Lissabon-Urteil: Democracy and a Democratic Paradox, 5 EUR. CONST.
L. REv. 341, 342 (2009).98 Editorial, supra note 3, at 1033.
99 The concept of Grundnorm (basic norm) or Ursprungsnorm (original norm) has been
developed by the Austrian legal theorist and philosopher Hans Kelsen to refer to the highest legal norm of
a legal system from which all other legal norms derive. A Grundnorm, as a single supreme legal rule, an
ultimate norm for norm-setting, a founding constitution, does not derive its own validity from any other
higher legal norm; its validity is presupposed. Bert van Roermund, Authority andAuthorisation, 19 L. &
PHIL. 201,205 (2000); N.W. Barber, Sovereignty Re-examined: The Courts, Parliament and Statutes, 20
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 131. 134-35 (2000).
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international law and the legal systems of the Member States. The
Community legal system, and everything built on it, is not, therefore, self-
sustaining: it is dependent on other legal systems and owes its validity to
them. The Treaties constitute the foundation of the Community legal
system, but the Treaties themselves have their foundation in international
law. To use other terminology, the Treaties do not constitute an
independent Grundnorm. A Grundnorm may be defined as a legal rule on
which all other rules in the system depend, but which does not itself
depend on any other legal rule. Its validity depends on non-legal
considerations. The Constitution of the United States is a Grundnorm, the
basic Treaties of the European Union are not. 100
The fear that the new flexibility clause gives the Union carte blanche to act and
thereby affect the nature of the Union is only justified insofar as this clause might
provoke envisioning the self-empowerment of the Union. Since the flexibility clause
is meant to be an exception, its actual use could hardly of itself transform the Union
into a state. Yet even if the European Union were to become a state, the BVerfG
ruled that it would be legally permissible under the condition that the Basic Law be
replaced with a constitution freely adopted by the German people on the basis of
Article 146 of the Basic Law.10 1
Moreover, in accordance with its Maastricht findings, the BVerfG maintained
that, despite the existence of Union citizenship, the Lisbon Treaty does not alter the
assessment that "the European Union lacks ... a political decision-making body
which has come into being by equal election of all citizens of the Union and which is
able to uniformly represent the will of the people." 10 2 As a result, and especially due
to the contingents of seats assigned to the Member States, the European Parliament
does not represent a sovereign European people, but the peoples of the Member
States. The European Parliament represents an institutional compromise between the
international law principle of equality of states and the national law principle of
electoral equality. 10 3 The BVerfG corroborated this with the argument that elections
to the European Parliament are based on the voters' nationality of their Member
States, a distinction otherwise absolutely prohibited in the Union. 10 4 A number of
scholars have criticized the BVerfG for taking nationality, and not residence, as the
correct basis of the right to vote for and be elected to the European Parliament. For
100 Trevor C. Hartley, The Constitutional Foundations of the European Union, 117 L. Q. REV. 225
(2001).
101 See also supra note 6.
10 2 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267.
103 Id. 284. The fact that electoral equality is not absolute and universal but assumes different
forms in different states was well accounted for in Schonberger's and Tomuschat's criticism that neither
Germany nor some other federal states (such as the United States or Switzerland) fulfill the condition of
rigid electoral equality that disregards the peculiarities of federalism, and especially the formation of
upper parliamentary chambers. Schonberger's criticism of the BVerfG's exclusive reliance on criteria of
democratic legitimacy as applicable in states is less convincing, because his own analysis is based on state
criteria. This however is not problematic, because using state criteria is inevitable in a world made up of
states and is not necessarily erroneous in and of itself. Rather, and this is what Schonberger particularly
insisted on, using idealized and abstract state criteria, and using them excessively, impedes the reaching of
sound and defensible conclusions. Schonberger, supra note 85, at 1210, 1215; Christian Tomuschat,
The Ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the Treaty ofLisbon, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1259, 1260-
1261 (2009).104Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 287.
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example, Halberstam and M61lers found this argument "flatly wrong," 10 5 Bieber
thought it was "incorrect," 10 6 Murkens regarded it as one of the BVerfG's
"inaccuracies and inconsistencies," 10 7 and Lock thought it was simply "not true." 108
Both the BVerfG and its critics base their arguments on the first sentence of Article
22(2) E.C., which reads:
[E]very citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not
a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in
elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he
resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.10 9
This provision gives the active and the passive right to participate in European
elections to those E.U. citizens who are not resident in their home Member State but
in another Member State. Member State residence is thus consecrated as a basis of
European electoral rights. However, there is nothing in this provision that indicates
that residence is the only basis of European electoral rights. This provision does not
state that nationality is not or may not be a basis for acquiring European electoral
rights, but that residence is and must be one of these bases. Since there is no uniform
electoral law of the Union, 110 national parliaments may foresee nationality as a basis
for the acquisition and enjoyment of European electoral rights. This means that
national parliaments are free to decide whether or not to give their nationals resident
outside the Union the right to participate in elections to the European Parliament in
that Member State, and whether or not to subject the exercise of that right to certain
conditions. If such a right were enacted in any Member State, it would mean that it is
possible for nationals of the Member States resident outside the European Union to
participate in European elections in their home Member State regardless of their
residency status in an E.U. Member State. What national parliaments may not do is
enact a law that would subject E.U. citizens resident in that Member State to
conditions different than those applicable to nationals of that Member State. The
italicized sections of this provision corroborate this argument. The argument is
further supported by the Council Directive of 1993 laying down detailed
arrangements for the exercise of European electoral rights, which provides that
"[n]othing in this Directive shall affect each Member State's provisions concerning
the right to vote or to stand as a candidate of its nationals who reside outside its
"' Halberstam & MOllers, supra note 86, at 1249.
106 Bieber, supra note 4.
o
7 Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, "We Want Our Identity Back"-The Revival of National
Sovereignty in the German Federal Constitutional Court's Decision on the Lisbon Treaty, PUBLIC LAW
(forthcoming 2010).
'
08 Tobias Lock, Comments on the German Constitutional Court's Decision on the Lisbon Treaty:
Why the European Union is Not a State: Some Critical Remarks, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 407,418 (2009).
109 Emphasis added.
110 Elections to the European Parliament are regulated by Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC,
Euratom: Decision of the Representatives of the Member States Meeting in the Council Relating to the
Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage, 1976
O.J. (L 278) 1, amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Amending the Act Concerning the Election
of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage, 2002 O.J. (L 283) 1. The
matters falling within the ambit of these acts may be further concretizedby national parliaments of the
Member States. The matters falling outside the ambit of these acts may be regulated by national
parliaments in accordance with national constitutional law.
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electoral territory." '111 The same Directive also prohibits discrimination on the basis
of residence: "Where, in order to stand as a candidate, nationals of the Member State
of residence must have been nationals for a certain minimum period, citizens of the
Union shall be deemed to have met this condition when they have been nationals of a
Member State for the same period."'1 12 To illustrate all this, the example that was
used by Halberstam and M6llers and later invoked by Lock is developed: it is true
that "[a]n Italian citizen who lives in Lithuania votes for the Lithuanian contingent in
the European Parliament." '113 But if that same Italian citizen moves to Russia and
obtains residence there, he or she need not necessarily lose the right to vote in the
European elections. He or she might still be entitled to vote, albeit in Italy, if Italian
law permits this. Residence is not an absolute and exclusive basis of European
electoral rights and the absence of residence in an E.U. Member State does not per se
deprive the person of his or her European electoral rights. Nationality might as well
grant it. Therefore, the aim of Article 22(2) E.C. is not to supersede nationality, but
to account for voter mobility across the Members States within the E.U. borders.
The above analysis permits several conclusions on the BVerfG's "democracy
solange." First, both the European Parliament and the national parliaments of the
Member States are sources of E.U. democracy. Their representative functions are not
mutually exclusive but complementary, which means in turn that neither the
European Parliament nor national parliaments can alone shoulder the Union's
democracy-related duties. Second, despite the complementarity of their
representative functions, the European Parliament and national parliaments do not
enjoy the same status in performing these functions: national parliaments are
primary and the European Parliament is supplementary. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, the BVerfG's view is that the European Parliament and national
parliaments each operate at their own levels of governance: the former at the
European level and the latter at the national level. The following section analyzes
this last facet of "democracy solange" in greater detail.
C. The German Parliament and the European Union: A Distant but
Harmonious Relationship
One of the novelties of the Lissabon-Urteil is the BVerfG's discussion of the
position of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat with respect to the Union's secondary
law. It is portrayed as a relationship between two realms that do not interact directly
but also do not preclude each other. In establishing a link between the citizen and the
European public authority, the BVerfG assessed the role of the German Parliament:
Parliament has not only an abstract "safeguarding responsibility" for the
official action of international or supranational associations but bears
specific responsibility for the action of its state. The Basic Law has
... Council Directive 93/109/EC, Arrangements for the Exercise of the Right to Vote and Stand as
a Candidate in Elections to the European Parliament for Citizens of the Union Residing in a Member State
of Which They Are Not Nationals, art. 1(2), 1993 O.J. (L 329) 34.
112 Id. art. 3(2). For more on the issues of electoral rights of non-E.U. nationals, see Jo SHAw, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ELECTORAL RIGHTS AND THE
RESTRUCTURING OF POLITICAL SPACE (2007).
113 Halberstam & Mollers, supra note 86, at 1249; Lock, supra note 108, at 418.
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declared this legitimising connection between the person entitled to vote
and state authority inviolable .... 114
In this passage, the BVerfG made two notable claims: (a) that the German
Parliament is responsible for the action of its state, i.e., that its competences as
regards E.U. decision-making are restricted to the German constitutional order and
thus to the control of the German representative in the Council; and (b) that such an
interpretation of the German Parliament's "specific responsibility" does not stem
from the founding treaties but from the Basic Law, which means that the European
Union may not dictate what the German Parliament's constitutional competences
will be.
This is substantiated by the following reasoning of the BVerfG: for the citizens'
voting right to fulfill its function, the Bundestag must "retain a formative influence
on the political development in Germany," which may be realized alternatively: (a) if
the Bundestag itself retains responsibilities and competences of substantial political
importance, or (b) if the Government can exert decisive influence on European
decision-making.115 Thus, the Bundestag's outreach is limited to Germany and to the
formation and control of the Government. It is not necessarily required for the
Bundestag to be able to influence E.U. decisions directly. The academic literature
also reveals that the German Parliament performs the so-called "supportive scrutiny"
of the Government, whereby the scrutiny of individual E.U. proposals is left to the
European Parliament. Quite illustrative of this is the fact that in the debates
preceding the Maastricht Treaty, the major political forces in the Bundestag
demanded that "the democratic deficit shall be eliminated in particular by
strengthening the European Parliament's legislative and control powers."'1 6 During
the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference the Bundestag again called upon the
Government not to institutionalize the role of national parliaments at the European
level and instead unconditionally supported the European Parliament in becoming a
co-legislator with the Council.
117
D. The Bundestag as a Fulcrum of European Integration
The BVerfG upheld the Bundestag's pivotal institutional position regarding
what could be referred to as static development of the Union, i.e., the development of
the Union that is subject to national ratification procedures. Conversely, dynamic
development of the Union is prohibited, because it circumvents the German
Parliament. Some of the key contentious issues are explained below.
First, the Approving Act was found compatible with the Basic Law and with the
principle of democracy principally because "the German people still decides on
essential political issues in the Federation and in the Ldnder,"118 "the German
114 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 175.
115 Id. 246.116 BTDrucks 11/7729, noted in BERTHOLD RITTBERGER, BUILDING EUROPE'S PARLIAMENT:
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 182 (2005).
117 Daniel Thym, Parliamentary Control ofEU Decision-Making in Germany: Supportive Federal
Scrutiny and Restrictive RegionalAction, in NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY: A
BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 49, 63 (Olaf Tans et al. eds., 2007).
118Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 274.
[Vol. 16
HeinOnline -- 16 Colum. J. Eur. L. 360 2009-2010
WHITHER DEMOCRACY AFTER LISBON?
Bundestag still retains sufficiently weighty responsibilities and competences of its
own,"' 119 and "the European Union does, even upon the entry into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon, not yet attain a shape that corresponds to the level of legitimisation of a
democracy constituted as a state."
120
In line with these three findings, the BVerfG concluded that the "Bundestag as
the body of representation of the German people is the focal point of an interweaved
democratic system., 121 While such an observation might be tenable for the
Bundestag's role in the process of conferral of powers, this is hardly the case with
secondary E.U. law. Similarly, bearing in mind that the BVerfG's yardstick was
whether Germany retains "substantial national scope of action for central areas of
statutory regulation and areas of life," 122 the BVerfG's conclusion is at odds with
frequent claims that over 80% of legislation in force in Germany is of European
origin.
1 23
Second, the BVerfG upheld the Amending Act regarding the question of
whether the Bundestag's right to bring an action before the E.C.J. in case of an
infringement by the Union of the principle of subsidiarity may be laid down as a
right of the parliamentary minority-in this case, one fourth of the members of the
Bundestag. This was found constitutional because the Bundestag's decision to
petition the E.C.J. does not have regulatory effect but only provides the power to
have recourse to a court.
1 2 4
Third, the BVerfG found that the mandatory requirement of parliamentary
approval for the deployment of the German Armed Forces abroad is "not amenable
to integration"-the Bundeswehr remains a "parliamentary army."' 125 The Member
States' potential military contribution pursuant to a Council decision 126 is a political
rather than a legal obligation. 127
Fourth, although the Lisbon Treaty entrusts the competence for common
commercial policy entirely to the Union and thereby makes national ratification
obsolete, the BVerfG did not find this constitutionally objectionable, because the
Union's participation alone in global trade negotiations does not negate the German
mechanism of responsibility for integration (Integrationsverantwortung). In
particular, when the Government informs the German Parliament of the rounds of
world trade talks and of the negotiation directives that the Council gives the
119 Id. 275.120 Id. 276.
121 Id. 277 (emphasis added).
122 Id. 351 (emphasis added).
123 A study by the German Ministry of Justice compared the legal acts adopted by Germany
between 1998 and 2004 with those adopted by the European Union in the same period and found that 84%
came from Brussels and only 16% from Berlin. Roman Herzog & Lfider Gerken, The Spirit of the Time:
Revise the European Constitution to Protect National Parliamentary Democracy, 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV.
209,210 (2007). See also Tilmann Hoppe, Die Europdisierung der Gesetzgebung: der 80-Prozent-Mythos
lebt, 20 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHATSRECHT 168 (2009).124 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 403-04.
121 Id. 254, 255, 381, 383.
126 E.U. Treaty art. 43(2).
127 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 387.
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Commission, 12 this is done not only as a general task of providing information but
also as a constitutional obligation of assuming joint responsibility for integration. 129
Lastly, the BVerfG ruled that the institutional recognition of national
parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty cannot compensate for the deficit surrounding the
election of the European Parliament. Instead, the status of national parliaments is
"considerably curtailed" by the reduction of the number of E.U. decisions that
require unanimity and by the transfer of the Third Pillar to the First Pillar. The
procedural safeguards are not an adequate substitute.130 In that respect, the
effectiveness of the monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity depends on whether
the national parliaments' right to bring action before the E.C.J. will also encompass
the question of the Union's competence for the specific proposal. 131
E. Dynamic Treaty Development as a Constitutional Barrier to European
Integration
One of the key reasons why the Draft Extending Act was annulled is that it did
not provide for parliamentary safeguards against what could be called "dynamic
treaty development," i.e., the amendment of the Union's primary law pursuant to the
procedures that do not require ratification by the Member States. 13 2 In all these fields
prior explicit consent133 by both parliamentary chambers in the form of a statute is a
prerequisite, because E.U. institutions may not "independently amend the
foundations of the European Union under the Treaties and the order of competences
vis-A-vis the Member States."' 134 The Draft Extending Act must therefore be
redrafted to accommodate the German Parliament's Integrationsverantwortung.
13 5
The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty where parliamentary approval was ruled
necessary are as follows:
1. The Bridging (Passerelle) Clauses
a. General Bridging Clauses
136
General bridging clauses represent two out of three procedures for the simplified
revision, i.e., amendment, of the founding treaties. The first type of general bridging
clause allows the European Council to authorize the Council of Ministers to act by
qualified majority instead of by unanimity in all the fields falling under the E.C., the
Union's external action, and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), except
in the field of defense and in relation to other decisions with military implications.
128 E.C. Treaty art. 218(2).
129Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 375.
130 Id. 293.
131 Id. 305.132 Id. 406, 409. The term Veranderung (amendment) that the BVerfG uses here, as distinct
from the term Vertragsdnderung (treaty amendment), only strengthens this argument. It might even serve
as the BVerfG's tool to ascertain which treaty amendments require ratification and which do not.
Halberstam & Mollers, supra note 86, at 1254.
133 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 413.134 Id. 306.
135 Id. 239.
136 E.U. Treaty art. 48(7).
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Such an authorization may be given for a whole area or for a single case. The second
type of general bridging clause allows the European Council to authorize the Council
to act in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure instead of in accordance
with the special legislative procedure in all the fields covered by the E.C.
With respect to both of these types of general bridging clauses, each national
parliament has the right to make known its opposition to a passerelle authorization
within six months. The procedure established by the Draft Extending Act to
operationalize this parliamentary right was found partly unconstitutional by the
BVerfG. The challenged provision laid down that where an E.U. proposal falls under
the ambit of concurrent legislation domestically, the Bundestag may only oppose the
Union's intention to use a general bridging clause if the Bundesrat does not object.
137
The BVerfG ruled that the Bundestag's exercise of this right may not depend on the
Bundesrat, because that would negate the Bundestag's Integrationsverantwortung.
13 8
The third procedure of simplified treaty amendment was not problematic
because the right of the European Council to amend all or part of the provisions of
the E.C. dealing with Union policies and internal action is subject to approval by the
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements and
may not increase the Union's competences.139
b. Special Bridging Clauses
Special bridging clauses have the same function as the general ones and operate
essentially under the same logic. The crucial difference is that special bridging
clauses exclude the parliamentary right of veto. The only special bridging clause that
provides for parliamentary veto is the one in the field of family law with cross-
border implications and resembles the second type of general bridging clause. The
remaining special bridging clauses exist in the fields of common foreign and security
policy, social policy, environmental policy, multiannual financial frameworks, and
enhanced cooperation.
40
With regard to both general and special bridging clauses, the BVerfG found that
the loss of German influence in the Council resulting from recourse to such clauses
must be predictable at the time of ratification and, since that was not the case, the
parliamentary approval of a later treaty amendment is not sufficiently democratically
legitimized. 14 1 Even when special bridging clauses are "sufficiently" or "factually"
determined, the German Parliament is still obliged to exercise its
Integrationsverantwortung "in another suitable manner." 142 For that reason,
Niedobitek argued that the BVerfG invented this term to justify the extension of the
German Parliament's "interference in the government's action." 143 Still, the
137 Draft Extending Act, supra note 75, art. 1(4)(3)(3).
1 8Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 415.
19 E.U. Treaty arts. 48(6)(2)-(3).
14
°Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 315.141 Id. 318.142 Id. 320.
143 Matthias Niedobitek, The Lisbon Case of 30 June 2009-A Comment from the European Law
Perspective, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1267, 1272 (2009).
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BVerfG's repulsion is directed towards dynamic integration rather than towards the
Government's action.
2. The Flexibility Clause
144
Under the current, post-Lisbon flexibility clause, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of
the European Parliament, adopt appropriate measures within the framework of the
policies defined in the Treaties if: (a) action by the Union proves necessary to attain
one of the Treaty objectives; and (b) the Treaties do not provide the necessary
powers for it. Compared to the previous, pre-Lisbon wording, several changes have
been made. First, action may be taken not only in the field of the common market
but also with respect to all other policies, except for CFSP. 145 Second, the European
Parliament is no longer merely consulted but is asked to consent to the application of
this clause. Third, the Commission shall draw national parliaments' attention to the
proposals based on this clause. The BVerfG, however, found none of the
parliamentary procedural safeguards sufficient because of the "undetermined nature
of future cases of application."' 146 Hence, both chambers must adopt an approving
statute. 147 The consequence is that the use of the flexibility clause for the
development of the common market, which has hitherto been unrestricted, is now
subject to parliamentary approval. This has been criticized as overly onerous. 148
3. The Emergency Brake in Criminal and Social Security Law
149
A member of the Council of Ministers may use the emergency brake whenever
he or she considers that a draft proposal in the field of criminal law with cross-border
implications would affect fundamental aspects of the criminal justice system of his
or her Member State. If that is the case, the matter is referred to the European
Council, after which it is returned to the Council of Ministers for a final decision.
Quite surprisingly, not only did the BVerfG subject the use of the emergency brake
to parliamentary approval, but it also vested the initiative for it in the German
Parliament. It may be used "only on the instruction" of the Bundestag, and if
required, of the Bundesrat. 150 This is bewildering because, as the BVerfG itself
claimed, the emergency brake is a "provision which accords a Member State special
rights in the legislative procedure." 151 Thus, the emergency brake is neither a right of
the Union nor a duty imposed on Member States. It is a means to protect the
144 E.C. Treaty art. 352 (originally Article 308 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community).145 It has been argued that the reference to the common market in the previous, pre-Lisbon
wording of the flexibility clause was not meant as an obstacle to the realization of new Community
policies but merely as an indicator that priority needed to be given to the proper functioning of the
common market. Contrarily, the Lisbon Treaty could be considered to restrict the application of the
flexibility clause only to those policies that are defined in the Treaties, thereby barring the creation of new
policies. Niedobitek, supra note 143, at 1275.14 6Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 326, 328.147Id. 417. The procedure is the same as for the transfer of powers to the European Union.
148 Halberstam & Mo1lers, supra note 86, at 1255.
149 E.C. Treaty art. 83(3).
15
°Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 365.
151 Id (emphasis added).
[Vol. 16
HeinOnline -- 16 Colum. J. Eur. L. 364 2009-2010
WHITHER DEMOCRACY AFTER LISBON?
Member States and as such cannot lead to a circumvention of the Member States'
parliamentary approval. The BVerfG treated the emergency brake in the same way
as the aforementioned bridging clauses, even though they have diametrically
opposite functions: the bridging clauses deepen integration; the emergency brake
hampers it. That is why the BVerfG's reasoning has rightly been described as
curious or paradoxical. 15 2 The requirement of a statute applies to the field of social
security mutatis mutandis.
153
4. The Extension of the List of Particularly Serious Crimes with a Cross-Border
Dimension
154
The European Parliament and the Council may adopt directives establishing
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offenses and sanctions in the
areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension. The Lisbon Treaty
lays down a list of areas of crime, which range from terrorism and human trafficking
to computer crime. As this is sufficiently predictable for the legislature and is
amenable to narrow interpretation at the time of application of these provisions, the
BVerfG had no objection in this respect. The Council may however extend the list of
the areas of crime on the basis of developments in crime. The BVerfG found that this
provision is a "dynamic blanket empowerment . . . factually tantamount to an
extension of the codified competences of the Union" and subjected it to approval by
a statute adopted by both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. 
155
5. The Extension of the Powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office
15 6
To combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council may
establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust. If this is done, the
European Council may extend the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's
Office to include serious crime with a cross-border dimension. In relation to this, the
requirement of a statute applies mutatis mutandis.
157
152 Not all criticism of the BVerfG's ruling is well placed, however. For example, Halberstam and
MOllers point out that the BVerfG referred only to the German Parliament instructing the German
representative in the Council of Ministers and that it said nothing of the German representative in the
European Council, which in their opinion could result in the lifting of the emergency brake altogether
when the matter is returned to the Council of Ministers. Halberstam & MOilers, supra note 86, at 1244.
This is not tenable for two reasons. First, the German representative in the European Council may not
"throw the matter back to the Council" of his or her own initiative, because there are twenty-six other
Member State representatives with whom the German representative needs to reach consensus. Second,
when the matter is indeed referred back to the Council of Ministers, which may not exceed the period of
four months, the German Parliament is free to decide to instruct the German representative to pull the
brake again. There is nothing in the Lisbon Treaty or in the BVerfG's judgment that indicates that the
right to pull the emergency brake in the Council of Ministers is exhausted after a single invocation.
153 E.C. Treaty art. 48(2).
154 E.C. Treaty art. 83(1)(3).
155 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 363.
156 E.C. Treaty art. 86(4).
157Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 419.
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6. The Amendment of the Statute of the European Investment Bank158
The same applies to the possibility for the Council to amend the Statute of the
European Investment Bank. The Statute is laid down in a protocol attached to the
founding treaties and enjoys therefore the same legal status as the Treaties.
The requirement of explicit bicameral parliamentary approval for dynamic
treaty development has been assessed as conservative when compared to the
BVerfG's counterparts in other Member States. 15 9  The French Conseil
Constitutionnel ruled that a single ratification sufficed; the Czech Constitutional
Court found the transfer of powers sufficiently specific and otherwise reviewable;
and the Dutch Raad van State160 did not address the question at all. At least as
regards the emergency brake, this assessment is justified, whereas the question
whether the rest of the BVerfG's decision was a hasty reflex will best be elucidated
by the practical application of the Lisbon Treaty. It must be countenanced that,
although parliamentary approval might be time consuming, it provides a form of
democratic legitimacy for the Union's intended action. Besides, the inconsistency of
the BVerfG's reasoning in imposing parliamentary approval is certainly more
striking than its conservatism, a dose of which has been present throughout and has
hardly undergone metamorphosis.
F. The Pillars'Farewell: To Be or Not to Be?
An issue that may impact national parliamentary scrutiny of E.U. affairs is
closely related to the BVerfG's understanding of the transformation of the Union's
pillar structure brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. 16 1 In accordance with the
opinion of Hans-Jlirgen Papier, President of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, 162 the BVerfG claimed that the pillars were abolished. 163 In the Lissabon
158 E.C. Treaty art. 308(3).
159 Philipp Kiiver, German Participation in EU Decision-Making After the Lisbon Case: A
Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1287, 1290
(2009). 160 Raad van State (Council of State) is not a constitutional court of the Netherlands and is thus
not a counterpart to the Bundesverfassungsgericht. It is the institution that, among other competences,
gives advisory opinions on proposals for the approval of treaties. See Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden [Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], art. 73. Besides, not only is there no
constitutional court in the Netherlands, but any other court is, pursuant to Article 120 of the Constitution,
prohibited to review the constitutionality of acts of parliament and treaties.
161 See also supra note 2.
162 Papier argued that "the current pillar structure of Europe is to be dissolved," that "the current
distinction between supranational Community law on the one hand, and Union law as a partial legal order
characterized by international law on the other, thereby becomes obsolete," and that "[t]hrough the
dissolution of the traditional pillar architecture, the Union gains a coordinated competence for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as for the whole of the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice." Hans-Jfirgen Papier, The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish "No. "Europe's New Realism: The Treaty of
Lisbon, 4 EuR. CONST. L. REv. 421,425 (2008). As I have argued elsewhere, such an appraisal might
profit from another perspective. Though a useful shorthand, "pillars" have never been mentioned in the
founding treaties but have instead been coined in academic and policy-making milieus. See, e.g., Bruno de
Witte, The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic
Cathedral?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER AMSTERDAM-A LEGAL ANALYSIS 51 (Teunis Heukels et
al. eds., 1998). The Treaties speak of "policies" or "fields" and the most important differentiating factors
between them are: (a) the decision-making procedure, which essentially determines the degree of
involvement of the European Parliament; (b) the voting requirement; and (c) the existence of the
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proceedings, the Bundestag disagreed without further explaining its standpoint. 164
What is then the relevance of this finding for national parliamentary scrutiny of the
draft E.U. proposals? While it might arguably imply that the function of a national
parliament with respect to E.U. acts should be the same in all pillars, it should not
conceal the fact that the unanimity requirement in the Second Pillar remains intact in
the Lisbon Treaty, albeit that qualified majority remains by way of derogation
applicable in four types of action. 165 The practical relevance of this argument for the
national parliaments' involvement in E.U. affairs might be qualified by two
antagonistic hypotheses:
1. Favorable to National Parliamentary Input
As unanimity must be reached in the Council for a measure to be adopted under
the Second Pillar, every Member State preserves the right of veto. This presumably
allows more forceful national parliamentary control to be exerted by tying the
Member State's representative in the Council to achieving a certain result during
negotiations and, subsequently, by holding him or her to account. 166 Also, as the
European Parliament is merely consulted and informed of the main policy
developments, national parliaments might be deemed a substitute or a complement to
it.
2. Unfavorable to National Parliamentary Input
Acts adopted under the Second Pillar fall nationally under the foreign affairs
portfolio, which is typically the prerogative of the executive branch and where
parliamentary influence is reduced. Furthermore, Second Pillar acts are not of
legislative nature, 167 which means that the legislative competence of national
parliaments is undiminished.
Yet empirical evidence that national parliamentary scrutiny of draft E.U.
proposals is sensitive to the Union's pillar structure remains scarce. In addition to
other factors, the activeness or passivity of national parliaments is rather determined
by the national interest at stake in a given draft proposal.
jurisdiction of the E.C.J. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty abolishes the pillar structure only formally, while
there are substantially still two pillars. Davor Jan~i6, Germany's Important Lisbon Treaty Judgment, EU
OBSERVER, Mar. 26, 2009, available at http://euobserver.com/9/27855. See also supra note 2.
163 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 30, 2009 (Lissabon-
Urteil), 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfUE] 267 ( 175) (F.R.G.).164 Id. 143.
165 Article 31(1) E.U. reads: "Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council
and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise." By way of
derogation, paragraph 2 thereof designates a qualified majority as the applicable voting requirement in the
Council when: (a) adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the
European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives; (b) adopting a decision
defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council; (c)
implementing a decision defining a Union action or position; and (d) when appointing a special
representative.
166 Nevertheless, the effects of the mandating of the national representative in the Council need
not always bring positive results. Two opposite examples are Austria and Denmark. See infra text
accompanying notes 218-21.167 E.U. Treaty arts. 24(1)(2), 31(1)(1).
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G. The Bundesverfassungsgericht's Review: Towards New Alleys of
Democracy Protection?
Should any of the national powers, including those of the German Parliament,
be usurped by the Union, two types of proceedings may be initiated before the
BVerfG in order to assert the Integrationsverantwortung: (a) the ultra vires review,
allowing the BVerfG to control whether the Union is expanding its powers beyond
those expressly conferred; and (b) identity review,168 allowing it to protect from
possible infringement by the Union the inviolable and unamendable core content of
the German constitutional identity entrenched in Articles 79(3), 1, and 20 of the
Basic Law, as well as to control the Union's adherence to the principles enumerated
in Article 23(1) of the Basic Law, 169 among which is the principle of democracy.
170
If violations are found in these proceedings, the challenged E.U. law is inapplicable
in Germany.
171
Curiously, the BVerfG claimed that the exercise of identity review follows the
principle of openness, i.e., friendliness, towards European law
(Europarechtsfreundlichkeit). 172  The German constitutional principle of
Europarechtsfreundlichkeit is laid down in Article 23 of the Basic Law, which
permits Germany's accession to the Union. It is also laid down in the Preamble,
whose second recital reads: "[i]nspired by the determination to promote world peace
as an equal partner in a united Europe .... ,173
The BVerfG inferred the link between its identity review and
Europarechtfreundlichkeit from the Union's duty under Article 4(2) E.U. to respect
the fundamental political and constitutional structures of the Member States. By
performing identity review the BVerfG "assists" the Union in fulfilling the latter's
duty of respect for national constitutional orders, which brings identity review into
harmony with the E.U. principle of sincere (or loyal) cooperation and renders it
E.U.-friendly. However, this is befuddling because identity review may result in the
rejection of any Union action that the BVerfG deems contrary to the German
constitutional structure. That hardly exhibits an openness or friendliness to European
law but rather reveals Europarechtsfreundlichkeit to be a volatile concept, whose
sheer generality allows the BVerfG to tailor its substance to achieve different goals.
It can be used to bolster integration but also to hamstring it. In effect, the BVerfG
demonstrated that German openness to European law is neither unreserved nor
finally determined but is instead limited and selective.
168 See also Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, Identity Trumps Integration: The Lisbon Treaty in the
German Federal Constitutional Court, 48 DER STAAT 517 (2009).169 See also infra Part VIIA.
17' For the BVerfG's references to the American doctrine of implied powers and to the principle
of effet utile in the law of international agreements, see Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfUE 123, 267, 237. For a
criticism thereof, see Halberstam & MOilers, supra note 86, at 1245.
171Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 241.
172 Id. 240.
173 See also Jacques Ziller, The German Constitutional Court's Friendliness Towards European
Law: On the Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht Over the Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, 16
EUR. PUB. L. 53 (2010).
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Furthermore, Schorkopf argued that, if measured against the backdrop of the
Solange cases, it appears that the BVerfG "has given up on the suspension of
national scrutiny reservations for community legislation," because ultra vires and
identity review as resulting from the Lissabon-Urteil permit the BVerfG to review
any European legal act for its conformity with the German constitution regarding
"obvious" transgressions of the boundaries of competence and identity. In his view,
this is a sign that "the BVerfG wants to play a more active role in European legal
matters."'1 7 4 This is in stark contrast with some other authors' general perceptions of
the BVerfG, such as the one describing it as an "uninvolved castigator on the
sidelines."
' 175
Lastly, the BVerfG seems keen on broadening its purview of control. This is
implicit in the BVerfG's statement that an additional type of proceedings may be
created by the legislature especially for these two types of constitutional review. 176
VII. THE LISBON AFTERMATH: WHAT SAFEGUARDS FOR THE GERMAN
PARLIAMENT?
As a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty and of the Lissabon-Urteil, the
constitutional and statutory bases for the participation of the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat in E.U. decision-making have accordingly been amended. They are
examined below.
A. Constitutional Framework for the Participation of the German Parliament
in E. U. Affairs
The provisions of Articles 23 and 45 of the Basic Law as amended in 2009177
occupy a pivotal place in the regulation of German parliamentary involvement in
E.U. affairs. We analyze them in turn.
To begin with, Article 23 of the Basic Law allows the Federation (not the
Ldnder) to transfer sovereign powers to the European Union by a statute with the
consent of the Bundesrat. Both chambers must adopt this statute by a majority of
two-thirds of the votes of their Members. 17 Yet Article 23 also sets the limits for
such a transfer. Namely, Germany is precluded from becoming or remaining a
Member State of the Union if the following principles are not respected in the course
of the Union's evolution: 1) the democratic principle; 2) the principle of social state;
3) the federal principle; 4) the rule of law; 5) the subsidiarity principle; 6) the
protection of fundamental rights that is essentially comparable to that afforded by the
Basic Law; 7) the participation of the Ldnder in the legislative process; and 8) the
right of all Germans to resist anyone seeking to abolish the German constitutional
order if no other remedy is available. 179
174 Frank Schorkopf, The European Union as an Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe 's
Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1219, 1232 (2009).
175 Schonberger, supra note 85, at 1217.
176 Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 241.
177 See supra note 74.
178 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 79(2).
17 9 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 1, 20, 23(1), 79(2)-(3).
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Further, Article 23 establishes the constitutional rights of information and
participation of both chambers of the German Parliament in E.U. decision-making:
1. Information Rights
The Government is obliged to keep the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed
comprehensively and at the earliest possible time.
2. Participation Rights of the Bundestag
The Government is obliged to allow the Bundestag to state its position before
the onset of the legislative procedure at the E.U. level and to take it into account
during the negotiations in the Council. The Bundestag's position is not legally
binding.
3. Participation Rights of the Bundesrat
Since Germany is a federal state in which competences are divided between the
Federation and the Ldnder, the Bundesrat takes part in the formation of the national
position on draft E.U. legislation insofar as it would be competent to do so in a
comparable domestic matter, or insofar as the subject falls within the domestic
competence of the Ldnder. Accordingly, there are three degrees of participation of
the Bundesrat. The first is that the Government is obliged to take into account the
position of the Bundesrat when the interests of the Ldnder are affected: (a) in an area
within the exclusive competence of the Federation, and (b) in other matters, insofar
as the Federation has legislative power. The second is that the position of the
Bundesrat shall be given the greatest possible respect in determining Germany's
position in the Council when a draft E.U. legislative proposal primarily affects the
legislative powers of the Ldnder, the structure of Land authorities, and Land
administrative procedures. The third, and the highest, is that the representation of
Germany in the Council shall be delegated to a representative of the Ldnder
designated by the Bundesrat when legislative powers exclusive to the Ldnder
concerning matters of school education, culture, or broadcasting are primarily
affected. This is also facilitated by Article 16(2) E.U.,18° which permits
distinguishing between different levels of authority in federal states by providing
that "[t]he Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at
ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question
and cast its vote." In the last two types of the Bundesrat's involvement, when the
Federation and the Ldnder represent each other's interests in the Council, such
representation must be exercised consistently with the responsibility of the
Federation for the nation as a whole.181
180 What is now Article 16(2) E.U. was formerly Article 203 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community.
181 For more on the participation of the Lander in E.U. affairs, see ADAM CYGAN, NATIONAL
PARLIAMENTS IN AN INTEGRATED EUROPE: AN ANGLO-GERMAN PERSPECTIVE 171-87 (2001); Juliane
Kokott, Federal States in Federal Europe: The German LAnder and Problems of European Integration, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS N THE ERA OF INTEGRATION 175 (Antero Jyranki ed., 1999); Tanja Brzel,
Restructuring or Reinforcing the State: The German Lander as Transnational Actors in Europe, in
GERMANY'S POWER IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 111 (Anne-Marie LeGloannec ed.. 2006): Thomas
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Moreover, the 2008 Amending Act established in Article 23 the right of the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat to bring action before the E.C.J. against E.U.
legislative acts that violate the subsidiarity principle. The Bundestag is obliged to
submit such an action at the request of a quarter of its members. 182
Finally, Article 45 of the Basic Law provides for the establishment in the
Bundestag of a committee for E.U. affairs and allows the Bundestag to authorize this
committee to act on its behalf vis-A-vis the Government. The 2009 amendment
widens this possibility, as the Bundestag may now authorize this committee to
exercise any power granted to the Bundestag by the founding treaties.
B. Statutory Framework of German Parliamentary Involvement in E. U. Affairs
The constitutional framework of the involvement of the German Parliament in
E.U. affairs is further elaborated by the following three statutes: 1) Act on the
Cooperation of the Federation and the Ldnder in E.U. Affairs of 1993 as amended in
2009;... 2) Act on the Cooperation of the Federal Government and the Bundestag in
E.U. Affairs of 1993 as amended in 2009 (the Bundestag Cooperation Act); 18 4 and 3)
Act on the Responsibility for Integration of 2009 (the Integration Responsibility
Act).185 This Article concentrates on the latter two statutes because of their
immediate relevance for the present inquiry into the manner in which the principle of
democracy has been woven into the German Parliament's participation in E.U.
decision-making. With a special focus on the Bundestag, the new arrangements and
instruments that have been placed at the German Parliament's disposal for the
purpose of scrutinizing E.U. affairs will be examined below. These arrangements
and instruments can be classified into four categories: parliamentary approval,
information rights, "early warning mechanism,"'18 6 and accountability of the
Government. Each will be examined in turn.
Christiansen, The Lander Between Bonn and Brussels: The Dilemma of German Federalism in the 1990s,
1 GERMAN POL. 239 (1992); Peter-Christian Miller-Graff, The German Lander: Involvement in EC/EU
Law and Policy Making, in THE ROLE OF REGIONS AND SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS IN EUROPE 103 (Stephen
Weatherill & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2005); Carlo Panara, The German Lander in the Process of European
Integration Between the F~deralismusreform and the Reform Treaty, 14 EUR. PUB. L. 585 (2008).
182 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 23(la).
183 Gesetz flber die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Landern in Angelegenheiten der Europlischen
Union [Act on Cooperation of the Federation and the Lander in E.U. Affairs], Mar. 12, 1993, BGB1l. I at
313, amended by Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes fiber die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Landern in
Angelegenheiten der Europflischen Union [Act Amending the Act on Cooperation of the Federation and
the Lander in E.U. Affairs], Sept. 22, 2009, BGB1. I at 3031 (F.R.G.).
184 Gesetz flber die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in
Angelegenheiten der Europflischen Union [Bundestag Cooperation Act of 1993], Mar. 12, 1993, BGB1l. I
at 311, amended by Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes fiber die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung
und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europflischen Union [Bundestag Cooperation Act of
2009], Sept. 22, 2009, BGB1l. I at 3026 (F.R.G.).
185 Gesetz flber die Wahrnehmung der Integrationsverantwortung des Bundestages und des
Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europflischen Union [Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz] [Integration
Responsibility Act], Sept. 22, 2009, BGB1l. I at 3022 (F.R.G.). This statute is enacted as Article 1 of the
Gesetz flber die Ausweitung und Starkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in
Angelegenheiten der Europflischen Union of Sept. 22, 2009 [Act on the Extending and Strengthening of
the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Affairs of Sept. 22, 2009].
186 The so-called "early warning mechanism" operates before the E.U. legislative procedure and
empowers national parliaments to monitor the Union's compliance with the subsidiarity principle by
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1. Parliamentary Approval
Along with the instances of static treaty development, the Integration
Responsibility Act subjects all instances of dynamic treaty development to
parliamentary approval. 18 7 Depending on the type of E.U. action, three types of
parliamentary approval are discernible: 1) approval by a statute (Gesetz) adopted by
both chambers; 2) approval by a decision (Beschluss) of the Bundestag, with a
possible consent of the Bundesrat where the legislative competences of the Ldnder
are affected;188 and 3) approval by both a decision and a statute in the case of
common defense. The types of approval are classified in the table below, after which
several remarks follow.
1. Simplified treaty revision by the European Council-Art. 48(6)(2) E.U.
2. Union's accession to the E.C.H.R.-Art. 218(8)(2) E.C.
Statute 3. System of own resources of the Union-Art. 311(3) E.C.
Static 4. Strengthening or widening of E.U. citizenship rights-Art. 25(2) E.C.
Treaty 5. Election of MEPs by direct universal suffrage-Art. 223(1)(2) E.C.
Develop. 6. E.C.J.'s jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes-Art. 262 E.C.
Decision
+ European Council's decision on common defense-Art. 42(2)(1) E.U.
Statute
1. General bridging clauses-Art. 48(7)(1)-(2) E.U.
2. Special bridging clause in cross-border family law-Art. 81(3)(2) E.C.
Statute 3. Extension of the list of serious cross-border crimes-Art. 83(1)(3) E.C.
4. Extension of powers of the European Public Prosecutor-Art. 86(4) E.C.
Dynamic 5. Amendment of the European Investment Bank Statute-Art. 308(3) E.C.
Treaty 6. Flexibility clause-Art. 352 E.C.
Develop. 1. Special bridging clause on multiannual fin. framework-Art. 312(2)(2) E.C.
2. Special bridging clause in social policy-Art. 153(2)(4) E.C.
Decision 3. Special bridging clause in environmental policy-Art. 192(2)(2) E.C.
4. Special bridging clause in enhanced cooperation-Art. 333(1)-(2) E.C.
5. Emergency brake in social security-Art. 48(2) E.C.
6. Emergency brake in criminal law-Arts. 82(3)(1) & 83(3)(1) E.C.
These enactments mirror the BVerfG's decisions in the Lissabon-Urteil very
precisely and cover all the fields of E.U. action where the BVerfG demanded
parliamentary approval.
It is noteworthy that as regards the general bridging clauses and the special
bridging clause in cross-border family law, both bicameral statutory approval and the
right to make opposition known have been retained as instruments enabling the
German Parliament to prevent the Union from amending the Treaties. There is,
however, an important difference between the two parliamentary instruments: prior
sending reasoned opinions on draft proposals to the E.U. institutions involved in the legislative procedure
(the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council). Under certain stringent conditions, this may
lead to the blockage of E.U. legislation. For more information on the subsidiarity principle see supra note
43, and on the "early warning mechanism" see infra Part VII.B.3. and the accompanying notes.
187 For the concepts of static and dynamic treaty development, see supra Part VI.E.
188 The consent of the Bundesrat is required if the intended E.U. action refers to a field where: (a)
there is no federal legislative competence; (b) the Lander have concurrent legislative powers and the
Federation has not acted; (c) the Lander have concurrent legislative powers and the Federation has acted
but the Lander are nonetheless entitled to act at variance with such federal laws; or (d) the consent of the
Bundesrat is required for federal law. See Integration Responsibility Act, art. 5(2).
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bicameral statutory approval is mandatory and must be given expressly (i.e. by
statute), whereas making opposition known is optional and can be given tacitly (i.e.
by not acting). In effect, this means that the German Parliament has two chances to
resist the Union's recourse to these bridging clauses. The first time is when the
initiative to use the bridging clauses is taken in the European Council. The German
representative may then only give agreement if both the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat have given their approval by a statute. The second time is when the
initiative is adopted and the decision made by the European Council. Within six
months, the Bundestag can-where exclusive legislative competences of the
Federation are affected-make known its opposition. In all other cases, both
chambers can do so.1 8 9 Since by the time the initiative is adopted the German
Parliament will already have passed an approving statute, it is not likely that the
second chance for refusal will be used, unless there is a major change in the
circumstances that led the German Parliament to approve the initiative.
The BVerfG's demand that the emergency brake1 90 can only be initiated by the
Bundestag, and where required by the Bundesrat, has been slightly watered down.
The wording1 91 of the Lissabon-Urteil implies that the Government would not only
be under a positive duty to pull the emergency brake in the Council when the
Bundestag decided so, but that it would also be under a negative duty not to act of its
own initiative. The negative duty has now been omitted, so that the Government is
indeed obliged to pull the brake if the Bundestag so decides but is not prohibited
from doing so of its own initiative where the Bundestag's decision is missing.
Finally, the measure of involvement of the Ldnder differs as to the type of E.U.
action and thus as to the type of parliamentary approval envisaged. To wit, the
emergency brake and all special bridging clauses except the one in cross-border
family law are subject to a decision by the Bundestag, which means that the consent
of the Bundesrat is required only insofar as the legislative competences of the
Ldnder are affected. All other instances of dynamic treaty development as well as
189 Integration Responsibility Act art. 10(1).
190 For an explanation of the emergency brake, see supra Part VI.E.3.
191 The second sentence of paragraph 365 of the English version of the Lissabon-Urteil reads:
From the perspective of German constitutional law, the necessary degree of
democratic legitimization via the national parliaments can only be guaranteed
by the German representative in the Council exercising the Member States'
rights set out in Article 82.3 and Article 83.3 E.C. only on the instruction of
the German Bundestag and, to the extent that this is required by the
provisions on legislation, the Bundesrat ....
(Emphasis added).
The German version reads:
Das notwendige MaB an demokratischer Legitimation fiber die
mitgliedstaatlichen Parlamente lflsst sich aus dem Blickwinkel des deutschen
Verfassungsrechts nur dadurch gewflhrleisten, dass der deutsche Vertreter im
Rat die in Art. 82 Abs. 3 und Art. 83 Abs. 3 AEUV genannten
mitgliedstaatlichen Rechte nur nach Weisung des Deutschen Bundestages
und, soweit die Regelungen fiber die Gesetzgebung dies erfordem, des
Bundesrates ausfibt ....
(Emphasis added).
In fact, the BVerfG mentioned the word "only" twice in both language versions (note
emphases). Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 30, 2009 (Lissabon-
Urteil, 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 267 ( 365) (F.R.G.)
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those of static nature are subjected to bicameral approval, which means that the
consent of the Bundesrat is always obligatory.
2. Information Rights
The Integration Responsibility Act in general and the Bundestag Cooperation
Act in particular have improved the German Parliament's rights of information on
E.U. affairs. The Government informs both chambers "comprehensively, at the
earliest possible moment, continuously, and as a rule in writing" about all E.U.
projects within two weeks. 192 The novelty is the requirement of written form and of
continuous provision of information, because comprehensiveness and provision of
information at the earliest possible time have already been required since 1993.193
The two-week deadline was taken over from the challenged Draft Extending Act.
19 4
The Government must inform the Bundestag not only of the E.U. projects "that
can be of interest to the Federal Republic of Germany," as has hitherto been the
case,195 but also of a wide range of other projects. Henceforth, besides draft E.U.
legislation, the projects to be transmitted include, inter alia: the Commission's green
and white papers; action plans, political programs, and inter-institutional agreements
of the organs of the Union; negotiation mandates and guidelines given to the
Commission in respect of the European Union's international treaties, common trade
policy, and rounds of world trade talks; notice of the initiation of infringement
proceedings before the E.C.J. insofar as they are related to Germany's failure to
implement directives, as well as of any other proceeding before the E.C.J. to which
Germany is a party; and, upon request, even unofficial preliminary papers of the
Commission and of the Council (so-called "non-papers"). 196
Furthermore, the duty to inform does not only encompass documents related to
E.U. institutions (the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the European
Parliament, informal ministerial meetings), but also documents and reports on the
meetings of COREPER 19 7 and Council working groups. Pertinently, information has
1912 Integration Responsibility Act art. 12(1), in conjunction with Article 7(1) of the Bundestag
Cooperation Act of 2009. Article 3 of the latter statute enumerates what is to be considered under "E.U.
projects."
193 Bundestag Cooperation Act of 1993 art. 3.
194 Draft Extending Act art. 2(1).
195 Bundestag Cooperation Act of 1993 art. 3.
196 Bundestag Cooperation Act of 2009 arts. 3(1), 4(4)(3)-(4), 5(3).
197 COREPER is the French acronym for Comitj des reprisentants permanents and is envisaged
in Article 240(1) E.C.:
A committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the
work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the latter.
The Committee may adopt procedural decisions in cases provided for in the
Council's Rules of Procedure.
COREPER operates at two levels: (a) at the level of deputy permanent representatives
(COREPER I), and (b) at the level of permanent representatives themselves, i.e., of ambassadors of the
Member States to the Union (COREPER II). In the hierarchy of the machinery of the Council of
Ministers, COPERER stands higher than the Council working groups and lower than the Council of
Ministers itself in its various sectoral configurations. COREPER is an indispensable part of E.U. decision-
making, because it has been estimated that up to 85-90% of E.U. decisions are not actually taken by the
ministers in the Council but by the Council working groups (some 70%) and COREPER (some 15-20%).
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to be provided on the convening, negotiations, and results of trilogues. 198 This is a
significant development because, as the British House of Lords emphasized in 2009,
"informal trilogues ... make effective scrutiny of codecided legislation by national
parliaments very difficult" chiefly because of the lack of transparency and
inaccessibility of these negotiations to the government, which is then precluded from
representing national parliamentary views.1 99
To enable the Bundestag to perform the so-called comprehensive assessment,
the Government must submit-alongside the documents themselves-the
Commission's, the other Member States', and its own assessment of the legal,
economic, political, financial, and ecological consequences for Germany of a given
E.U. project in terms of its regulatory content, alternatives, costs, and requirements
of compliance and implementation. 20 0 The Government also sends its assessment of
the conformity of the E.U. project with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality, which is facilitated by the specification of the legal basis of the
project.20 1 Additionally, as an early notification, the Government informs the
Bundestag about the current political developments and planned E.U. projects as a
202
rule in writing.
The measures adopted under the CFSP and Common Security and Defense
203Policy (CSDP) are expressly excluded from the list of E.U. projects.
Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Government still sends the Bundestag a
summary of the forthcoming legal acts scheduled for deliberation and an assessment
of the further course of deliberations, and orally informs it of all relevant
developments promptly and comprehensively. 20 4 In these two fields, the Bundestag
may also request documents of fundamental importance for the assessment of
subsidiarity and proportionality together with the legal basis of a given draft legal
act.
With regard to accession negotiations or those aimed at amending the founding
treaties, the Government must point out to the Bundestag that it has the right to issue
a position statement on these negotiations. 2 °' Before the final decision in the
Council, the Government shall reach consensus on the matter with the Bundestag,
but the Government retains the right to deviate from it for important reasons of
foreign and integration policy.
20 6
PHILIPPA SHERRINGTON, THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
46 (2000); Ramses Wessel, The Constitutional Unity of the European Union: The Increasing Irrelevance
of the Pillar Structure?, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND LISBON 283, 289 (Jan Wouters et al.
eds., 2009).
198 Bundestag Cooperation Act of 2009 art. 5(1)(1)-(3).
199 HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, CODECISION AND NATIONAL
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY, 2008-9, H.L. 125, at 20.
200 Bundestag Cooperation Act of 2009 arts. 4(2), 7(2).
201 Id. arts. 4(4)(2), 7(1), 6(1)(3).
202 Id. art. 4(3).
203 Id. art. 3(1)(2).204 Id. arts. 8(1), sentence 4, 8(3).
205 Id. art. 10(1).206 Id. art. 10(2).
2010]
HeinOnline -- 16 Colum. J. Eur. L. 375 2009-2010
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW
Lastly, the Government must make available to the Bundestag all the E.U.
databases that are accessible to it in the framework of data protection and the
Bundestag must respect the special confidentiality of the documents contained
therein.20 7
3. "Early Warning Mechanism"
The above information rights facilitate the German Parliament's control of the
conformity of draft E.U. legislative proposals with the subsidiarity principle. Under
the Lisbon Protocol on subsidiarity, any national parliament or a chamber of it may,
within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft proposal in the official
languages of the Union, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the
Council, and the Commission a reasoned opinion stating why the draft proposal in
question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. 208 The reasoned opinions
count as votes. Each national parliament has two votes. If the number of allocated
votes reaches the threshold of simple majority and the Commission decides to
proceed with the proposal, then the destiny of the proposal is decided by the "Union
legislator," i.e., by the Council and the European Parliament. If a majority of 55% of
the members of the Council or a majority of the votes cast in the European
Parliament decide that the proposal infringes the principle of subsidiarity, the
proposal falls. Therefore, this parliamentary power is predominantly negative. It is
aimed at blocking E.U. legislation that seeks to regulate matters in which, in the
opinion of national parliaments, action at the E.U. level is not justified.20 9
If the Bundestag or the Bundesrat issue a reasoned opinion, the Presidents of the
respective chambers transmit the opinion to the said E.U. institutions and inform the
Government thereof.210 The procedure can be regulated in more detail in the Rules of
Procedure of the chambers.
4. Accountability of the Government
For the first time, a clear mechanism of ex ante and ex post accountability of the
Government to the German Parliament in E.U. affairs is foreseen beyond the general
principle of political responsibility laid down in Articles 67 and 68 of the Basic
Law.211
2
17 Id. art. 11.
208 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Protocol no. 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and
Proportionality), art. 6(1), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
209 Id. art. 7. For further information, see George Bermann, The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish "No."
National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: An Outsider's View, 4 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 453 (2008); Jean-
Victor Louis, The Lisbon Treaty: The Irish "No. "National Parliaments and the Principle of
Subsidiarity-Legal Options and Practical Limits, 4 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 429 (2008); Ian Cooper, The
Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic ofArguing in the E. U., 44 J. COMMON
MKT. STuD. 281 (2006).
210 Integration Responsibility Act art. 11(2).
211 Bundestag Cooperation Act of 2009 art. 5(5). See also supra note 56.
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a. Negotiation Strategy Exchange
Before the meetings of the European Council and the Council, the Government
informs the Bundestag in writing and orally of each discussion point, which includes
the essentials of the proposal, the state of negotiations, and the negotiation strategy.
After the Council meetings, the Government informs the Bundestag of the results in
writing and orally. The same mechanism applies in the fields of CFSP and CSDP.
b. Position Statements
In line with the constitutional requirement, the Government must give the
Bundestag the opportunity to state its position on a given draft E.U. legal act before
the onset of the decision-making procedure. The Government also informs the
Bundestag when a position statement would be appropriate given the procedural time
restraints.
If the Bundestag states its position, the Government shall use it as a basis for
negotiations in the Council. The novelty is that the Government shall report to the
Bundestag on the extent to which the latter's position has been asserted during the
negotiations. It is also new that the Bundestag may modify or supplement its position
during the course of the negotiations, in which case the Government shall take the
amended position into account and report on it afterwards.
c. Parliamentary Reserve
As the most stringent instrument, Article 9(4) of the 2009 Bundestag
Cooperation Act introduced a parliamentary reserve (Parlamentsvorbehalt), which is
drafted in very similar terms as the parliamentary reserve that was crafted in 2006 in
light of the European Constitutional Treaty but never entered into force because of
the Treaty's failure.212
The parliamentary reserve operates as follows. When the Bundestag issues a
position statement and the Government acting in the Council is unable to exact the
main concerns expressed therein, the Government shall invoke the parliamentary
reserve and inform the Bundestag of this immediately. This is done in a separate
212 In 2005, the Act on the Extending and Strengthening of the Rights of the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat in European Union Matters was passed, but it never entered into force because of the failure of
the European Constitutional Treaty. One of the changes it was meant to make was to insert a clause into
the 1993 Bundestag Cooperation Act to the effect that the cooperation between the Government and the
Bundestag be regulated in more detail in an agreement (Vereinbarung) between the Government and the
Bundestag. This agreement was indeed adopted on September 28, 2006, and published in the Federal Law
Gazette. Vereinbarung zwischen dem Deutschen Bundestag und der Bundesregierung fiber die
Zusammenarbeit in Angelegenheiten der Europflischen Union in Ausfihrung des § 6 des Gesetzes fiber
die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der
Europflischen Union [Agreement Between the German Bundestag and the Federal Government on
Cooperation in European Union Affairs in Implementation of § 6 of the Act on Cooperation Between the
Federal Government and the German Bundestag in the European Union Affairs], Sept. 30, 2006, BGB1. I
at 2177 (F.R.G.). Since the 2005 Extending Act was still on the statute book, but could never enter into
force, the new 2009 Extending Act was adopted after the Lissabon-UrteiL Article 1 thereof laid down the
2009 Integration Responsibility Act and Article 3 repealed the 2005 Extending Act. In the same time
period, a separate 2009 Bundestag Cooperation Act was adopted, which took over many provisions from
the 2006 Agreement.
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report, which must be of such a form and substance as to enable the Bundestag to
deliberate on it. Before the final decision in the Council is made, the Government
shall endeavor to reach consensus with the Bundestag on the matter. Failing that, the
Government may only deviate from the Bundestag's position for important reasons
of foreign or integration policy. After the decision has been made in the Council, the
Government informs the Bundestag of it immediately and in writing, and especially
of the assertion of the Bundestag's position in Brussels. When not all of the
Bundestag's concerns have been taken into account the Government must provide
reasons, and, upon the Bundestag's request, this will be done in a plenary debate.
If observed from a comparative perspective, one might ponder the nature of
these arrangements. Is the new German parliamentary reserve more akin to the
scrutiny reserves of the British, French, or Dutch type, or does it rather resemble the
mandating arrangements of the Austrian or Danish type?
The British scrutiny reserve is laid down in the resolutions of both the House of
Commons and the House of Lords. It prevents the minister acting in the Council
from giving agreement to any draft E.U. proposal that is still subject to scrutiny
and/or needs to be further considered or debated.213 It is not legally binding but if the
minister overrides it, he or she should provide explanations for it. The main goal of
the scrutiny reserve is to leave both Houses of Parliament enough time to reach an
informed opinion on a draft proposal, upon which the opinion is communicated to
214the Government and the proposal cleared from scrutiny. The French scrutiny
reserve is based on the Government's own commitment not to agree on a proposal if
the Parliament has not completed scrutiny. 2  As Siritzky asserts, this is a "political
process rather than a legal one, as France does not recognize the practice of the
'negotiating mandate.' 216 In the Netherlands, the Government must invoke a
scrutiny reserve in the Council whenever one of the chambers finds a proposal to be
of such particular political significance that it wishes the Government to inform it
more specifically about it. Within the ensuing four weeks, the Parliament may hold
213 See H.C. RES. SCRUTINY RESERVE, Nov. 17, 1998 (U.K.); H.L. RES. SCRUTINY RESERVE, Dec.
6, 1999 (U.K.). For more details on the United Kingdom, see Adam Cygan, Democracy and
Accountability in the European Union-The View from the House of Commons, 66 MOD. L. REV. 384
(2003); Adam Cygan, EU Affairs Before the United Kingdom Parliament: A Case of Scrutiny as
Substitute Sovereignty?, in NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY: A BOTTOM-UP
APPROACH TO EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 75 (Olaf Tans et al. eds., 2008); ADAM CYGAN,
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN AN INTEGRATED EUROPE: AN ANGLO-GERMAN PERSPECTIVE (2001); ADAM
CYGAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT AND EUROPEAN UNION LEGISLATION (1998).214 Interview with Lord Roper, Chairman of the E.U. Select Committee, and with James Whittle,
Second Clerk of the E.U. Select Committee, in London, U.K. (Nov. 24, 2009).
215 See Circulaire du 19 juillet 1994 relative A la prise en compte de la position du Parlement
frangais dans l'6laboration des actes communautaires, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jul. 21, 1994, available at http://www.franceurope.org/pdf/adapt/
Cir190794.pdf. See also Circulaire du 13 dcembre 1999 relative A l'application de l'article 88-4 de la
Constitution, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 17,
1999, available at http://www.sante.gouv.fr/adm/dagpb/bo/1999/99-50/aO503387.htm.
216 David Siritzky, Ensuring Democratic Control of National Government in European Affairs:
The French Model, in NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE FOR THE OIREACHTAS AND OTHER MEMBER STATE LEGISLATURES 433, 441 (Gavin Barrett
ed.. 2008).
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consultations with the Government about the importance of, inter alia, the proposal,
the state of negotiations, and the legislative procedure. 17
In Austria and Denmark, the parliaments may give mandates to the ministers,
but the respective mechanisms are mutually contrasting. On the one hand, the
Austrian Nationalrat and the Bundesrat have a constitutional right to issue legally
binding opinions on draft E.U. proposals in all pillars, but they have used this right
only once, in relation to the very first binding opinion, and never again.218 On the
other hand, the Danish Folketing has neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to
mandate the national representative in the Council, but does so pursuant to a
convention that emerged in 1973 as a consequence of a political crisis.21 9 The Danish
parliamentary mandate operates as a "negative clearing procedure," whereby the
negotiation strategy that the Government presents to the E.U. Committee is
considered the negotiation mandate, unless there is a majority against it. As
Fitzmaurice has rightly underscored, "the Minister is politically obliged to follow the
opinion" of the Committee. 220 This is to a large extent determined by the political
environment of minority governments in Denmark, which poses considerable
constraints on the Government's freedom of action. Since such a political climate
does not characterize any of the most influential Member States, Denmark is perhaps
too easily touted as the prototype of effective national parliamentary involvement in
E.U. affairs.22 1
217 Rijkswet van 10 juli 2008, houdende goedkeuring van het op 13 december 2007 te Lissabon
totstandgekomen Verdrag van Lissabon tot wijziging van bet Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie en
bet Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap [Dutch Act of Approval of the Lisbon Treaty],
art. 4(1), Staatsblad [Official Journal] 301 (2008), available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/
stb-2008-301.html. See also Leonard Besselink & Brecht van Mourik, The Roles of the National
Parliament and the European Parliament in EU Decision-Making: The Approval of the Lisbon Treaty in
the Netherlands, 15 EUR. PUB. L. 307 (2009).
218 Articles 23(e)(2) and (6) of the Austrian Federal Constitution explicitly lay down the cases
where the Federal Government is "bound in negotiations and voting by the position" of the Nationalrat or
the Bundesrat. Barbara Blfimel & Christine Neuhold, The Parliament ofAustria: A Large Potential with
Little Implications, in NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ON THEIR WAYS TO EUROPE: LOSERS OR LATECOMERS?
313, 321 (Andreas Maurer & Wolfgang Wessels eds., 2001).
219 Finn Laursen, The Danish Folketing and its European Affairs Committee: Strong Players in
the National Policy Cycle, in NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ON THEIR WAYS TO EUROPE: LOSERS OR
LATECOMERS? 99, 104 (Andreas Maurer & Wolfgang Wessels eds., 2001).
220 John Fitzmaurice, National Parliaments and European Policy-Making: The Case of Denmark,
29 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 281,288 (1976).
221 This argument is nicely developed in the following assessment:
If a stable majority came into power, the government would still be obliged to
submit an oral mandate for negotiation to the committee. And the party
groups in government would continuously have the possibility and, most
likely, the need to act as a unitary actor, hence forming a majority behind the
minister before the meetings in the committee. This would diminish the
strength of the committee as an instrument in the hands of the party groups in
opposition. Representatives from the opposition would still have the
possibility of posing critical questions and point out weak spots in the
government policy, but would not be able to block the minister.
Henrik Jensen, A Modelfor the Strictest Scrutiny? The Danish European Affairs Committee in
a Party Group Pespective, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: LINKING
SOCIETAL AND STATE PROCESSES OF DEMOCRACY 207, 226 (Ronald Holzhacker & Erik Albwk eds.,
2007).
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In this constellation, the German parliamentary reserve is best placed half way
between the Dutch and Austrian mechanisms. On the one hand, it does not resemble
the British and French scrutiny reserves because there is a difference in their
purpose: the German parliamentary reserve is not particularly oriented towards
scrutiny but towards achieving a certain result in Brussels. Furthermore, although
some key aspects of it are reminiscent of the Danish mechanism, such as the duty of
the minister to base negotiations on the parliament's views (in Denmark through a
mandate formulated negatively by not opposing the Government's plans or in
Germany through the Bundestag's position statement), the political climate of party
discipline in Germany does not warrant any further comparison.
On the other hand, the German parliamentary reserve is, like the Dutch one,
aimed at consultations with the Government on the negotiation plans and at
impressing the parliament's views on those European projects that it considers of
great importance. Yet the German system goes beyond that, because it prohibits the
Government from diverging from the Bundestag's position, except where important
foreign or integration policy reasons to do so exist. If such reasons do not exist, the
Government must assert the Bundestag's position in Brussels. In this respect, the
German parliamentary reserve resembles the Austrian mandating system. It
nonetheless falls short of establishing a legally binding duty on the part of the
Government, which is formally under no parliamentary mandate in any field.
However, the substance of the German parliamentary reserve encompasses almost all
of the elements of the Austrian mandating system except for the "legally binding"
shell. The existence of the "legally binding" aspect in Austria and its absence in
Germany should not be overemphasized because the key to determining the true
powers of the parliament does not necessarily lie in the legal norms as such, but in
the way they are applied. Neither in Germany nor in Austria does the parliament
have the power to legally chastise the Government, apart from the unlikely case that
a certain proposal provokes such vehement disagreement with the government that
the parliament loses confidence in it. The fact that the role of national parliaments
is-as Sieberson correctly assessed-"largely consultative" 222 is hardly lamentable,
given that the whole process of negotiating draft E.U. legislation is to a large extent
informal and directed to lobbying rather than to using draconian measures of
pressure, such as toppling the minister or the whole Government. Even in domestic
affairs, such measures are in almost all Member States used with great caution.
For all of the above reasons, the refurbished German system of parliamentary
participation in E.U. decision-making is, compared to the previous arrangements,
rather wide-ranging in legal terms, but whether full use of the new instruments will
be made remains to be seen. In any event, the new procedures related to the timing,
form, and amount of information; to the exchange of opinions regarding the
Government's negotiation strategy; and to the parliamentary reserve have the
potential to pose substantial constraints on the Government's behavior in Brussels.
222 Stephen C. Sieberson, The Treaty of Lisbon and its Impact on the European Union's
Democratic Deficit, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 445,463 (2008). For the background to this assessment in his
earlier article on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, where he examined the role of the
Member States and their parliaments in the European Union, see Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed
European Union Constitution-Will it Eliminate the EU's Democratic Deficit?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
173.236-41 (2004).
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The German Parliament is at liberty to utilize them to hold the Government to
account more rigorously.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Despite the theoretical pitfalls and the relapse into the sovereignty doctrine, the
Lissabon-Urteil, charged with being "a black day in the history of Europe, 223 "a
political manifesto, '224 "a strange combination of rhetoric and verbosity, '225 "a
negative assessment of the status quo,, 226 and a "rejection of European
democracy, ' 227 is not all that deplorable. If an isolated analysis might make the
judgment appear verbose, a retrospective appraisal is quite telling. In the thirty-five
years since Solange I, the BVerfG has consistently highlighted the centrality of
democracy for the viability of the European Union as a political community and has,
in various guises and to various degrees, insisted on its realization primarily through
the parliamentary channel.
While the BVerfG showed full deference to a European parliament in the
Solange I judgment, already in the Solange II judgment it denied that the European
Parliament is a constitutionally binding parameter for assessing E.U. democracy. In
the Maastricht-Urteil, the inquiry no longer concentrated on whether the European
Parliament has acquired any powers but on whether the German Parliament retained
the right to authorize their transfer. With the European Arrest Warrant case, the
German Parliament's primary responsibility to legitimize Third Pillar law was
affirmed.
In the Lissabon-Urteil, the BVerfG's emphasis on the democratic legitimization
of the European Union by national parliaments reached its climax. This is part of a
broader tendency to intensify the emphasis on national parliaments as European
integration deepens and as competences are withdrawn from the purview of the
national parliament. In the "democracy solange," the BVerfG denied the possibility
for the European Parliament ever to surpass its supplementary character. To that end,
the BVerfG utilized many tools: (a) it rejected dynamic treaty development; (b) it
tailored the principles of Integrationsverantwortung and Europarechtsfreundlichkeit
to the need of safeguarding the position of the German Parliament in the Union;
228
(c) it adhered to the dualist approach to European integration, according to which the
223 Alfred Grosser, The Federal Constitutional Court's Lisbon Case: Germany's "Sonderweg"-
An Outsider's Perspective, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1263 (2009).
224 Tomuschat, supra note 103, at 1259.
225 Halberstam & Mollers, supra note 86, at 1258.
226 Thym, supra note 91, at 1813.
227 Id. at 1812.
228 For this reason, these two concepts hardly add anything new. Contrarily, Schorkopf and
Niedobitek considered Integrationsverantwortung a new category, because the BVerfG used it to
underpin the rejection of dynamic treaty development. Niedobitek, supra note 143, at 1272; Schorkopf,
supra note 174, at 1221. However, while dynamic treaty development is indeed a new category in the
Lisbon Treaty, Integrationsverantwortung is not. It is in its nature and in its effects precisely the same as
the parliamentary responsibility for integration devised in the Maastricht-Urteil. The goal was and still is
to prevent the flow of national powers to the Union without parliamentary endorsement. The German
Parliament's duty to exhaust the margin of appreciation imposed in the European Arrest Warrant
judgment carries the same rationale.
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national and the European legal orders are separate; and (d) it asserted its own
229powers by burnishing the ultra vires and identity review.
In doing so, the BVerfG practically refused to espouse the integration of the
German Parliament into what some authors have described as a multilevel,
230
composite a2 1 or pluralist23a European constitution. In his latest account on multilevel
constitutionalism in the Union, Ingolf Pernice, who was an authorized representative
of the Bundestag in the Lissabon proceedings, rightly stated that "the formal
constitutional status of national parliaments in the European decision-making
processes is an important innovation.' 2 33 Nonetheless, the BVerfG refuted his
argument that the inclusion of national parliaments in dynamic treaty revision
procedures together with the other newly acquired competences "clearly demonstrate
that the national parliaments are becoming a constituent part of the multilevel
European institutional system. 2 34
Admittedly, the BVerfG did flirt with the idea that the guarantee of national
constitutional identity under constitutional law and that under Union law go hand in
hand in the European legal area a35 as well as the idea that political orders need not
be structured according to a strict hierarchy. 36 Thym saw this as a "prominent
recognition of the composite responsiveness of national and European law ' 2 37 and as
an "implicit reference to the concept of multilevel constitutionalism. 2 38 Though
these might be primordial signposts of the BVerfG's possible exploration of these
concepts in the future, the fervor with which it expounded the preeminence of
Germany's sovereignty and of its national parliament begs a different conclusion. At
least at this point in time, the BVerfG's findings remain "the 'conservative'
counterpoint to contemporary narratives of 'post-sovereign' statehood. 2 39 The
following passage from the Lissabon-Urteil captures the essence of it succinctly:
The Basic Law aims to integrate Germany into the legal community of
peaceful and free states, but does not waive the sovereignty contained in
229 The identity review can easily be traced throughout the case law analyzed in this contribution,
whereby the dissimilarities in the BVerfG's approach were a matter of scope rather than that of reasoning.230 Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty ofAmsterdam: European
Constitution-Making Revisited, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 703 (1999); Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel
Constitutionalism in the European Union, 27 FUR. L. REV. 511 (2002).
21'LEONARD BESSELINK, A COMPOSITE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION (2007); Leonard Besselink,
National Parliaments in the EU's Composite Constitution: A Plea for a Shift inParadigm, in NATIONAL
AND REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 117 (Philipp Kiiver ed.,
2006); Ingolf Pernice & Franz C. Mayer, De la Constitution Composde de l'Europe, 36 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPtEN 623 (2000).
232 Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002); Neil Walker,
Big "C "or Small "c"?, 12 EUR. L.J. 12 (2006); Neil Walker, Post-Constituent Constitutionalism?: The
Case of the European Union, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 247 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007).
233 Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 349, 391 (2009).2 34 Id. (emphasis added).
235 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun. 30, 2009 (Lissabon-
Urteil), 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 267 ( 240) (F.R.G.).236 Id. 340.
237 Thym, supra note 91, at 1810.
238 Id. at 1811.239Id, at 1805.
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the last instance in the German constitution. There is therefore no
contradiction to the aim of openness to international law if the legislature,
exceptionally, does not comply with the law of international agreements
[i. e. primary E. U. law]-accepting, however, corresponding
consequences in international relations-provided this is the only way in
which a violation of fundamental principles of the constitution can be
averted.240
In the end, it is fair to conclude that Karlsruhe's caveats on democracy have not
changed much. They have only become more pronounced. In fact, they were loud
enough to sound an alarm in Berlin and provide an incentive, whether direct or
indirect, for a major reform of the system of German parliamentary participation in
E.U. affairs, ranging from the enhancement of information rights, to the introduction
of the requirement of approval for dynamic treaty development, to the resurrection of
the parliamentary reserve of 2006. Since the European Union will certainly not use
any of the instruments of dynamic treaty development as a rule of action, but only in
exceptional circumstances, the Lissabon-Urteil is in fact a remarkable success: the
BVerfG did not frustrate the necessary institutional reform of the Union, while
concomitantly contributing to a significant empowerment of Germany's national
parliament in scrutinizing E.U. decisions. In this respect, the Lissabon-Urteil is
commendable. It has fulfilled its objective more than one might have expected, and
certainly more than the majority of academics have been willing to acknowledge.24 1
240Lissabon-Urteil, BVerfGE 123, 267, 340 (emphasis added). See also supra text
accompanying note 87 (opinion of the BVerfG on the withdrawal from the European Union).
241 As the editorial comment of the European Constitutional Law Review put it:
But for the moment, who would deny that there is a loss of transparency,
democratic accountability and electoral equality for German voters if
competences are exercised by the Union rather than by German institutions?
And aside from the legal merits of the judgment under German constitutional
law: who cannot at least understand why the court, in the name of democracy,
objects to the Union taking fundamental decisions on substantive and formal
criminal law, on the employment of police and military forces, on the budget,
on the welfare state, on family law and the school and education system and
so forth in Germany, given the Union's present democratic state of affairs?
Editorial, supra note 97, at 344.
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